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INTRODUCTION
While talking about the regulation of fully autonomous2
motor vehicles—cars that can drive themselves—might seem
premature, some of the technologies that will make
autonomous motor vehicle operation possible are already
appearing in vehicles. Indeed, the first demonstrations of
some of these technologies date as far back as 1939.3 Recent
research by companies, such as Google,4 and the Grand and
2. This Article generally uses the term “autonomous,” instead of the term
“automated.” We have chosen to use the term “autonomous” because it is the
term that is currently in more widespread use (and thus is more familiar to the
general public).
However, the latter term is arguably more accurate.
“Automated” connotes control or operation by a machine, while “autonomous”
connotes acting alone or independently. Most of the vehicle concepts (that we
are currently aware of) have a person in the driver’s seat, utilize a
communication connection to the cloud or other vehicles, and do not
independently select either destinations or routes for reaching them. Thus, the
term “automated” would more accurately describe these vehicle concepts.
3. General Motors’ (GM) 1939–40 New York World’s Fair exhibit entitled
“Futurama” was one of the early examples of an autonomous vehicle concept.
Its concept involved automated vehicles traveling in dedicated lanes and being
guided safely through traffic by radio control signals from a traffic control
tower. See RANDAL O’TOOLE, GRIDLOCK: WHY WE’RE STUCK IN TRAFFIC AND
WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 189–91 (2009).
4. Google has developed a small fleet of autonomous vehicles that rely on
video cameras, radar sensors, laser range finders, and maps collected by the
company and are always manned with a driver trained to take over by
disengaging cruise control when necessary. Sebastian Thrun, What We’re
Driving At, OFFICIAL GOOGLE BLOG (Oct. 9, 2010, 12:00 PM),
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Urban Challenges5 sponsored by the Defense Advanced
Research Programs Agency (DARPA) have sought to develop
autonomous driving technologies further with an eye toward
large-scale
civilian
and
military
deployment.
Notwithstanding the steady progress being made, systems
designed to assume complete control from the driver,
including the performance of safety critical operations, are
not yet feasible as they are incapable at this stage in their
technological development of resolving and navigating
through all of the many different driving scenarios that might
arise. Although there are many technical challenges that
must be overcome before vehicles can drive themselves
reliably in all scenarios, many autonomous driving
technologies are being incorporated into vehicles sold today
for use in discrete scenarios. In the near future, more and
more vehicles will be equipped with various autonomous
driving technologies, creating the potential for large safety
and mobility (i.e., congestion reduction) benefits.
The
mobility benefits would, in turn, have fuel consumption and
carbon dioxide emission reduction benefits.
Government actions can influence the extent and the
speed with which autonomous driving technologies are
adopted. For example, in the most recent revision of the New
Car Assessment Program (NCAP),6 the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) initiated the practices
of making recommendations to consumers regarding those
advanced crash avoidance technologies that the agency
deemed most promising (based on existing data regarding
http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2010/10/what-were-driving-at.html.
Sebastian
Thrun is a Google Vice President and Fellow, and a Research Professor at
Stanford University. Sebastian Thrun, STANFORD.EDU, http://robots.stanford
.edu/index.html (last visited May 13, 2012). As of late March 2012, the mileage
total had reached 200,000 miles. GOOGLE+, https://plus.google.com/u/0/1168990
29375914044550/posts/MVZBmrnzDio#116899029371168990293/posts/MVZBm
rnzDio (last visited Oct. 9, 2012).
5. See Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, History, DARPA.MIL,
http://www.darpa.mil/About/History/Archives.aspx (last visited Oct. 9, 2012)
(listing archival material relating to these challenges).
6. NCAP enables the agency to publish comparative safety information,
which encourages manufacturers to voluntarily improve safety in their vehicles.
See NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., DOT HS 810 698, THE NEW CAR
ASSESSMENT PROGRAM SUGGESTED APPROACHES FOR FUTURE PROGRAM
ENHANCEMENTS (2007), available at http://www.safercar.gov/staticfiles/DOT/
safercar/pdf/810698.pdf.
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their effectiveness) and of identifying those vehicles that are
equipped with these systems.7 In addition, NHTSA has
publicly announced that it will work toward a decision8 in
2013 on whether to initiate rulemaking to mandate and set
performance requirements for various advanced crash
avoidance technologies whose effectiveness could be increased
through vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communications.9 As the
United States government agency responsible for the safety of
new motor vehicles, NHTSA will inevitably play a vital role in
monitoring, encouraging, conducting research regarding and,
as necessary, regulating autonomous driving technologies
through the application of the agency’s authority over motor
vehicles and motor vehicle equipment. As motor vehicles
incorporating these technologies become an increasingly
larger part of the overall fleet of vehicles in operation, the
crash data are expected to begin to show the significant safety
benefits of these technologies. Where needed to address
safety risks arising from any of the vehicles with these
technologies, the agency will take appropriate action.
NHTSA has broad authority to regulate these new
technologies and currently has various regulatory
tools/methods that can be applied in addressing these new
potential challenges.
With this perspective in mind, this Article begins with a
brief overview of some of the autonomous driving technologies
7. See Press Release, NHTSA, Auto Safety Agency Unveils List of Vehicles
to be Tested as Part of Revamped Safety Ratings Program (Oct. 13, 2011),
available at http://www.nhtsa.gov/About+NHTSA/Press+Releases/2011/ci.NHT
SA+Announces+Model+Year+2012+Vehicles+to+be+Rated+Under+Government
+5-Star+Safety+Ratings+Program.print.
8. See NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., NHTSA VEHICLE SAFETY
AND FUEL ECONOMY RULEMAKING AND RESEARCH PRIORITY PLAN 2011–2013
(2011), available at http://www.nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/rulemaking/pdf/20112013_Vehicle_Safety-Fuel_Economy_Rulemaking-Research_Priority_Plan.pdf.
9. Vehicle-to-Vehicle Communications for Safety is the wireless exchange
of data between nearby vehicles that offers the opportunity for significant safety
improvements. By exchanging vehicle-based data regarding position, speed,
and location (at a minimum), V2V communications enables a vehicle to: sense
threats and hazards with a 360-degree awareness of the position of other
vehicles and the threat or hazard they present; calculate risk; issue driver
advisories or warnings; or take pre-emptive actions to avoid and mitigate
crashes.
Connected Vehicles Applications: Vehicle to Vehicle (V2V)
Communications for Safety, RESEARCH & INNOVATIVE TECH. ADMIN. (Aug. 16,
2012, 12:02 PM), http://www.its.dot.gov/research/v2v.htm [hereinafter
Connected Vehicles Applications].
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(including advanced crash avoidance technologies) that lead
to the autonomous motor vehicle. Then, this Article reviews
NHTSA’s regulatory authority and explores the possible role
that the agency might play in the implementation of
autonomous driving technologies. Afterward, the Article
evaluates some of the challenges of developing and drafting
appropriate and effective standards for these new
technologies, investigating defects, and encouraging
voluntary adoption of safety technologies (through programs
like NCAP). In these sections, we conclude that (while
additional research and information will likely be necessary)
many of the current methods used by NHTSA can still be
applied to these advanced technologies.
I.

TODAY’S ADVANCED TECHNOLOGIES MAKE AUTONOMOUS
MOTOR VEHICLES POSSIBLE

It is important to understand at the outset that
autonomous driving technologies do not represent a farfetched, futuristic concept. There is a continuum of these
technologies, and many of them are already available today.10
As current advanced crash avoidance technologies become
more developed and are able to work in conjunction with each
other, vehicles will increasingly become able to drive
autonomously.11
A. Progressing from Driver Monitoring and Control to
Vehicle Monitoring and Control
For the purposes of this Article, we will be using the
NHTSA approach to defining the different levels of
autonomy12 (see below). In NHTSA’s research, the agency has
10. For example, as lane-keeping technology and adaptive cruise control
mature, these two technologies could theoretically work together to enable a
vehicle to drive autonomously in a lane of a limited access highway. See Damon
Lavrinc, Next Audi Flagship Will Drive Autonomously in Traffic Jams,
http://www.autoblog.com/2012/01/12/
AUTOBLOG (Jan. 12, 2012, 12:31 PM),
next-audi-flagship-will-drive-autonomously-in-traffic-jams/ (Audi’s new system
that will enable autonomous driving in traffic jam situations).
11. See Bill Howard, The Almost-Self-Driving Lincoln Won’t Let You Drive
Hands-off, EXTREMETECH (Nov. 29, 2011, 2:13 PM), http://www.extreme
tech.com/extreme/107037-the-almost-self-driving-lincoln-won%E2%80%99t-letyou-drive-hands-off (describing how automakers are linking current crash
avoidance technologies to achieve low level automation).
12. For its own internal purposes, NHTSA uses the term “automation”
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used five categories to describe different levels of autonomy.
These levels are shown in the following table.

1. Non-Automated
In this category, the human is in complete and sole
fundamental control of the vehicle at all times. While current
vehicles (without any advanced crash avoidance technologies)
can be included in this category, vehicles with warning
systems that assist drivers also fall into this category.
Vehicles equipped with these technologies will not assume
control for any driving tasks, but will provide additional
information to the driver and/or warn the driver of situations
requiring immediate attention.
Navigational global
positioning systems (GPS) are an example of a currently
available technology which provides information useful to the
overall task of driving, and potentially highly valuable to V2V
communications.13 Lane Departure Warning (LDW) is an
example of a currently available warning technology.14 This
technology alerts the driver when his or her vehicle begins to
drift out of the lane of travel.15 Like other information and
instead of “autonomy” for the reasons explained in supra note 2.
13. At the heart of V2V communications is a basic application known as the
Here I Am data message. See Connected Vehicles Applications, supra note 9.
This message can be derived using non-vehicle-based technologies such as GPS
to identify location and speed of a vehicle, or vehicle-based sensor data wherein
the location and speed data is derived from the vehicle’s computer and is
combined with other data such as latitude, longitude, or angle to produce a
richer, more detailed situational awareness of the position of other vehicles. Id.
14. Lane Departure Warning is currently available on Infiniti and Mercedes
Benz models among others.
E-Class Sedan, MERCEDES-BENZ USA,
http://www.mbusa.com/mercedes/vehicles/class/features/class-E/bodystyleSDN/vehicle-safety (last visited Oct, 9, 2012); Infiniti M: Specifications and
Options, INFINITI USA, http://www.infinitiusa.com/m/specs-options (last visited
Oct, 9, 2012).
15. NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., DOT HS 811 405, ADVANCED
CRASH AVOIDANCE TECHNOLOGIES (ACAT) PROGRAM – FINAL REPORT OF THE
VOLVO-FORD-UMTRI PROJECT: SAFETY IMPACT METHODOLOGY FOR LANE
DEPARTURE WARNING – METHOD DEVELOPMENT AND ESTIMATION OF BENEFITS
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warning technologies, a LDW system does not intervene to
prevent the driver from departing the lane.16 It merely
monitors the lane markings on the roadway to determine
whether the vehicle is keeping within its current driving
lane.17 LDW systems can also warn the driver if lane
makings cannot be detected or if the system malfunctions.18
2. Automation-Assisted
The “automation-assisted” category still leaves the
driving authority squarely with the driver. However, under
limited normal driving or crash imminent circumstances,
technologies in this category will take control away from the
driver. An example of this type of technology is the electronic
stability control (ESC).
ESC systems use automatic
computer-controlled braking of individual wheels to assist a
driver in maintaining control in critical driving scenarios in
which the vehicle is beginning to lose directional stability at
the rear wheels (spin out) or directional control at the front
wheels (plow out).19
Another advanced example of
automation-assisted driving is a lane-keeping system that
will actively steer a vehicle back toward the center of its lane
when the system detects that the vehicle is drifting into an
adjacent lane or is on a collision course with a vehicle in an
adjacent lane.20
14 (2010), available at http://www.nhtsa.gov/DOT/NHTSA/NVS/Crash%20
Avoidance/Technical%20Publications/2010/811405.pdf [hereinafter NHTSA,
ACAT PROGRAM].
16. Id.
17. Id.; FED. MOTOR CARRIER SAFETY ADMIN., CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS
AND VOLUNTARY OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR LANE DEPARTURE WARNING
SYSTEMS ON-BOARD COMMERCIAL MOTOR VEHICLES (2005), available at
http://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/facts-research/research-technology/report/lanedeparture-warning-systems.htm.
18. Id.
19. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Electronic Stability Control
Systems; Control and Displays, 72 Fed. Reg. 17,236 (Apr. 6, 2007) (final rule)
(codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 571). NHTSA issued a notice of proposed rulemaking
on May 23, 2012, proposing to require ESC on all vehicles with a gross vehicle
weight rating over 26,000 pounds. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards;
Electronic Stability Control Systems for Heavy Vehicles, 77 Fed. Reg. 30766
(proposed May 23, 2012) (to be codified 49 C.F.R. pt. 571), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2012-05-23/pdf/2012-12212.pdf.
20. NHTSA, ACAT PROGRAM, supra note 15, at 14. NHTSA is currently
conducting research on advanced braking technologies that utilize forwardlooking sensors to detect impending crashes and assist the driver in avoiding or

WOOD

11/14/2012 12:53 AM

2012]

POTENTIAL CHALLENGES OF AMVS

1431

3. Monitored Automation
The “monitored automation” category is the first category
in which the technology will share the driving responsibility
with the driver. However, in this category, the human driver
is expected to be ready to take control of the vehicle at all
times. Thus, the autonomous technology is only able to
assume the responsibility of driving when the conditions
permit. For example, some vehicles on the market today are
available with automatic parallel parking systems. This type
of technology differs from automation-assisted driving
technologies because the driver gives a general command to
the vehicle (e.g., “park in this space”) and the vehicle
effectuates that command by assuming control of the steering
and making the necessary steering calculations.21 Another
potential example is the combination of adaptive cruise
control with lane-keeping. The combination of these two
technologies would potentially enable vehicles to proceed
down the freeway with little or no input from the driver.
However, depending on the level of sophistication in this
system, drivers might still be required to intervene at any
moment (e.g., lane markings disappear and the vehicle can no
longer position itself in the center of the lane).
4. Conditional Automation
In this category, the technology is sufficiently reliable
such that the human driver is able to completely cede the
driving responsibility to the autonomous driving system
under certain circumstances. This category differs from
“monitored automation” systems as drivers using “conditional
automation” systems would not need to be able to assume
control of the vehicle within a moment’s notice. In theory, the
vehicle would be able to warn the driver of an impending
condition sufficiently in advance so that the driver can safely

mitigating these crashes. See Advanced Braking Technologies that Rely on
Forward-Looking Sensors; Request for Comments, 77 Fed. Reg. 39561 (July 3,
2012) (soliciting comment on test protocols used to evaluate sensor based
dynamic braking systems and the performance of these systems), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2012-07-03/pdf/2012-16250.pdf.
21. See Doug Newcomb, Self-Parking Systems Comparison Test, EDMUNDS
INSIDE LINE (Nov. 26, 2010), http://www.insideline.com/features/self-parkingsystems-comparison-test.html.

WOOD

11/14/2012 12:53 AM

1432

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52

take control. However, the drivers would be expected to be
available to take control when so warned.
5. Full Automation
As the final category in the above diagram, “full
automation” driving encompasses all of the systems necessary
for the vehicle to perform automatically and independently all
driving tasks in all driving scenarios. This vehicle would
integrate various technologies from the previous three
categories to perform all driving tasks such that a person is
no longer driving. An example of a technology in this
category would be a vehicle that is capable of bringing the
driver anywhere. The only driver input would be the
destination. The vehicle would be responsible for all driving
decisions and actions during travel.
B. Connected Vehicle Technologies Can Reinforce and
Complement Autonomous Technologies
As an added dimension, it is important to note that the
technologies on the continuum (stretching from today’s
advanced crash avoidance technologies to tomorrow’s
autonomous driving system) can use different methods for
obtaining information to make judgments about a vehicle’s
surroundings (such as through the use of sensors or
communications with other vehicles/infrastructure).22
Thus, an “autonomous motor vehicle” is a concept distinct
from a “connected vehicle” (a vehicle which communicates
with other vehicles or infrastructure). A vehicle can perform
autonomous driving functions without communicating with
other vehicles, and a connected vehicle might have the ability
to receive information and relay it to the driver, but might not
have the ability to drive autonomously. For example, the
lane departure warning safety function described above could
be accomplished through the use of only sensors/cameras or it
22. See, e.g., Kathleen Doheny, Technology Aimed at Helping Drowsy
(Jan.
12,
2012)
Drivers
Stay
Awake,
EDMUNDS.COM
http://www.edmunds.com/car-safety/technology-aimed-at-helping-drowsydrivers-stay-awake.html (stating that current forward collision warning and
lane departure warning systems often use cameras and sensors). See also
Connected Vehicles Applications, supra note 9 (listing the various safety
applications being researched for vehicle-to-vehicle communications, which
includes forward collision warnings and lane change warnings).
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could be accomplished through the use of a communication
between vehicles identifying each vehicle’s position and
heading.23 Further, as evidenced by Google’s autonomous
motor vehicle project, autonomous driving can be possible
through the use of cameras and sensors without any vehicle
communications apart from map updates.24
While
communications can be an enabling technology which can
provide an effective means to augment or supplant the same
functions of vehicle sensors and cameras, future deployment
of autonomous motor vehicles or vehicles with advanced crash
avoidance technologies (such as lane departure warnings) can
occur independent of vehicle communications.
NHTSA has been exploring the use of vehicle
communications as a way to complement or (in some
scenarios) act as an alternative for sensor-based detection for
advanced crash avoidance systems.25 The research concept is
that vehicles would transmit safety-related information (e.g.,
location, direction and speed) to each other so as to enable
each vehicle to identify potential conflicts (i.e., collisions).
After these conflicts are identified, vehicles could issue
warnings for the driver or possibly take evasive or preemptive
action in order to avoid or at least mitigate a crash.26 The
research explores various types of crash scenarios that can be
addressed through V2V communications and identifies seven
crash scenarios that could be effectively addressed by this
technology (such as forward collision, lane departure, and
From these studies, it
intersection movement assist).27
appears that vehicle communications have the potential to act

23. See Doheny, supra note 22.
24. See John Markoff, Smarter Than You Think: Google Cars Drive
Themselves, in Traffic, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2010, at A1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/10/science/10google.html.
25. See NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., DOT HS 811 492A,
VEHICLE SAFETY COMMUNICATIONS APPLICATIONS (VSC-A) FINAL REPORT xi
(2011),
available
at
http://www.nhtsa.gov/DOT/NHTSA/NVS/Crash%20
Avoidance/Technical%20Publications/2011/811492A.pdf [hereinafter NHTSA,
VSC-A FINAL REPORT].
26. See NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., DOT HS 811 373, USDOT
CONNECTED VEHICLE RESEARCH PROGRAM: VEHICLE-TO-VEHICLE SAFETY
APPLICATION
RESEARCH
PLAN
1
(2011),
available
at
http://www.nhtsa.gov/DOT/NHTSA/NVS/Crash%20Avoidance/Technical%20Pub
lications/2011/811373.pdf.
27. See NHTSA, VSC-A FINAL REPORT, supra note 25, at xii.
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not only as an enabling technology for autonomous motor
vehicles, but also as a technology that can enhance an
autonomous motor vehicle’s ability to identify potential
problems and take appropriate actions to avoid them. V2V
communications have the potential to provide additional
information to the autonomous motor vehicle (covering areas
beyond the range of the on-board sensors) and enable more
robust performance of autonomous driving technologies.
While there is a significant degree of overlap between
what vehicles can achieve using sensor-based crash avoidance
technologies and what vehicles can achieve using V2V
communications, there are some areas in which the
capabilities of these systems differ.
Sensor-based
technologies might have a greater capacity to avoid single
vehicle crashes because V2V communications rely on the
presence of other vehicles to avoid crashes while sensors have
the ability to operate independently of other vehicles. Sensorbased technologies might enable a vehicle to determine its
location more accurately in some settings, e.g., urban areas
with tall buildings.28 Conversely, V2V communications might
be able to prevent crashes that sensor-based crash avoidance
technologies cannot because V2V communications systems
can communicate information beyond the range of sensorbased technologies.29
As discussed below in the next section, legal issues that
apply to autonomous motor vehicles and connected vehicles
are closely related.
II. NHTSA’S GENERAL AUTHORITY OVER MOTOR VEHICLE
SAFETY
Congress enacted the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle
Safety Act (the “Safety Act” or “the Act”) in 1966 with the
purpose of reducing deaths and injuries as a result of motor
vehicle crashes and non-operational safety hazards
28. Jesse Levinson and Sebastian Thrun, Stanford University, 2010 IEEE
International Conference on Robotics and Automation: Robust Vehicle
Localization in Urban Environments Using Probabilistic Maps (May 3-8, 2010).
29. An example of such a scenario is an intersection crash for which V2V
communications might be able to provide a warning that another vehicle is
about to enter the intersection at a high rate of speed but a sensor-based system
may not be able to provide such a warning because of the angle involved and the
limited range of the sensors.
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attributable to motor vehicles.30 The Act, as amended, is now
codified as 49 U.S.C. §§ 30101 et seq.
To accomplish this purpose, the Act authorizes NHTSA to
use several major tools to address motor vehicle safety
concerns associated with motor vehicles31 and motor vehicle
equipment.32 The Act authorizes the agency to set motor
vehicle safety standards for new motor vehicles and motor
vehicle equipment and requires the recall and remedy of
vehicles and equipment that do not comply with the
standards in place at the time of manufacture.33 It also
authorizes NHTSA to conduct investigations about possible
safety defects and requires the recall and remedy of motor
vehicles and motor vehicle equipment determined to have a
safety defect. We will briefly introduce each tool below.
The Act mandates that the standards to be issued by
NHTSA be “practicable, meet the need for motor vehicle
safety and [be] stated in objective terms.”34 In order to issue a
standard, NHTSA must determine that the vehicle or item of
equipment falls under NHTSA’s authority (i.e., is a motor
vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment within the
meaning of the Act), that there is a safety need, and that the
standard will meet that need. The Act also establishes a selfcertification framework for ensuring compliance with the
safety standards. Under this framework, NHTSA establishes
performance standards35 for motor vehicles and motor vehicle
equipment to which manufacturers of these products are
required to certify that their products conform. NHTSA does
not certify or approve products.
The agency does not regulate the actions of vehicle
owners, the operation of motor vehicles on public roads or the
maintenance and repair of vehicles-in-use. Further, NHTSA

30. H.R. REP. NO. 89-1776, at 10 (1966).
31. See 49 U.S.C. § 30102(a)(6) (2006).
32. See § 30102(a)(7).
33. Manufacturers must certify that their products comply with the
applicable Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS) at the time of
manufacture.
34. 49 U.S.C. § 30111(a) (2006).
35. H.R. REP. 89-1719, at 15 (1966) (stating that, while Congress intended
to protect the public from “inherently dangerous designs,” Congress did not
intend for motor vehicle safety standards to directly address issues of vehicle
design).
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has only limited authority to prevent after-market
modifications that remove or reduce the effectiveness of the
federally-required safety features of a vehicle. While various
types of commercial entities are prohibited by the Act from
making such modifications to motor vehicles owned by other
parties, vehicle owners may modify their own vehicles.36
Further, NHTSA does not have authority to require
retrofitting of older vehicles with new safety equipment
unless the vehicle is a commercial vehicle.37 Thus, NHTSA
works with the States regarding the making of periodic
inspections to ensure that certain basic safety equipment on
vehicles remains intact and functional after vehicles cease to
be new, i.e., after their first sale for purposes other than
resale.38
Manufacturers are obligated to recall and remedy
without charge motor vehicles and motor vehicle equipment
that are determined to fail to comply with one of the agency’s
standards or to contain a defect that poses an unreasonable
risk to motor vehicle safety.39
If NHTSA makes the
determination, it must do so through a process that allows
the affected manufacturer a chance to be heard.40 In almost
all cases, however, the determination is made by the
manufacturer (although often after the agency has initiated
an investigation).41

36. The Safety Act expressly prohibits motor vehicle repair businesses from
“mak[ing] inoperative any part of a device or element of design installed on or in
a motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment in compliance with an applicable
[FMVSS].” See 49 U.S.C. § 30122(b) (2006).
37. See 49 C.F.R. § 1.95(c) (2010) (delegating to NHTSA, in coordination
with the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA), the powers
vested in the Secretary of Transportation by subchapter III of chapter 311 of
title 49 of the United States Code to promulgate safety standards for
commercial motor vehicles and equipment subsequent to initial manufacture).
38. To aid the States in conducting inspections of used vehicles, 49 U.S.C §
30126 directed NHTSA to establish safety standards for the inspection of used
vehicles. See 49 U.S.C. § 30126 (2006). Pursuant to that direction, NHTSA
established standards to be used by the States in conducting inspections. See
49 C.F.R. pt. 570 (2010).
39. 49 U.S.C. §§ 30118, 30120 (2006).
40. § 30118(b).
41. See Christopher Jensen, 2010 a Record Year for ‘Voluntary’ Recalls, N.Y.
TIMES WHEEL BLOG (Jan. 20, 2011, 11:33 AM), http://wheels.blogs.ny
times.com/2011/01/20/2010-a-record-year-for-voluntary-recalls/.
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In addition to setting mandatory vehicle safety standards
to which vehicles must be certified, NHTSA also conducts the
New Car Assessment Program (NCAP) that generates and
provides the public with comparative performance ratings to
encourage vehicle manufacturers to improve the safety of
their vehicles voluntarily. Since 1979, NHTSA has been
giving safety ratings to certain new vehicles through NCAP.42
Currently, “NHTSA rates a sample of new vehicles that are
predicted to have high sales volume, those that have been
structurally redesigned, or those with improved safety
equipment.”43 Those vehicles are assigned a rating from one
to five stars (lowest to highest) based on their success in
frontal and side crash tests and in rollover resistance tests.44
In the crash tests, anthropomorphic dummies are placed in
the test vehicles.
The dummies are equipped with
accelerometers that measure the forces to which the dummies
are subjected in those tests. Vehicles with body structures,
energy absorbing materials and restraint systems that are
relatively more effective in managing the crash forces receive
higher scores.
NCAP ratings are made publicly available and vehicle
manufacturers may advertise these ratings, thus providing
an incentive to achieve higher ratings. High NCAP scores are
widely used by vehicle manufacturers in advertising to
demonstrate to potential buyers the safety attributes of the
vehicles they produce. Thus, through providing the public
with objective information on the relative safety performance
of new vehicles, NCAP has been successful in achieving its
purpose of creating consumer awareness of those differences,
thereby creating market forces that prompt vehicle
manufacturers to make added safety improvements to their

42. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-370, VEHICLE SAFETY:
OPPORTUNITIES EXIST TO ENHANCE NHTSA’S NEW CAR ASSESSMENT PROGRAM
8 (2005).
43. See
NHTSA
5-Star
Ratings
FAQ,
SAFERCAR.GOV,
http://www.safercar.gov/FAQ (last visited Oct. 22, 2012).
44. NHTSA’s NCAP program has been publishing comparative consumer
information on frontal crashworthiness of new vehicles since 1979, on side
crashworthiness since 1997, and on rollover resistance since January 2001.
Consumer Information Regulations; Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards;
Rollover Resistance, 66 Fed. Reg. 3388 (Jan. 12, 2001) (Response to Comments,
Notice of Final Decision).
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vehicles.45 Additionally, as a result of recent amendments by
the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act—
“MAP-21,”46 the agency may require that additional types of
NCAP information be displayed on the “Monroney label.”
which is affixed to the side window of new automobiles.47
Thus, consumers have this safety information at the point of
sale
Recently, NHTSA has begun under the NCAP Program to
note online the presence in vehicle models of three types of
voluntarily-installed crash avoidance systems: electronic
stability control, lane departure warning and forward
collision warning. In order to have one of these crash
avoidance systems listed on NCAP website (safercar.gov) for a
vehicle model, the manufacturer must design the system so
that it meets the minimum performance criteria established
by the agency for that type of system.
III. NHTSA’S BROAD AUTHORITY OVER AUTONOMOUS DRIVING
TECHNOLOGIES AND EQUIPMENT
The vehicle technologies that make autonomous
operation possible are vastly different than those that existed
when the Safety Act was enacted in 1966. Then, the vehicle
operating systems were largely mechanical and controlled by
the driver via mechanical inputs and linkages. Components
and systems were either designed into the vehicle at the time
45. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 42, at 2.
46. Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act of 2012, Pub. L. No.
112-141, 126 Stat. 405 (2012), available at http://www.gpo.gov/
fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112hr4348enr/pdf/BILLS-112hr4348enr.pdf.
47. In 2005, Congress enacted the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient
Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU), requiring
automobile manufacturers to disclose NCAP ratings for new vehicles on
Monroney labels as of September 1, 2007. Pub. L. No. 109-59, § 10307, 119
Stat. 1941 (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1232(g)–(h) (2006)). This requirement
was modified by the recent enactment of MAP-21. Pub. L. No.112-141, § 31315,
126 Stat. 405. The amendment permits the agency to require ratings for
additional aspects of safety performance on the Monroney labels. Id. Monroney
labels are the labels placed on new automobiles with the manufacturer’s
suggested retail price and other consumer information, as required in 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1231–1233 (2006). On www.safercar.gov, NHTSA supplements the label
information by indicating whether any one or more of three recommended
advanced technology features (ESC, FCW, and LDW) comes as standard or
optional equipment on particular vehicle models. NHTSA 5-Star Ratings FAQ,
supra note 43.
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of original manufacture or were later attached to or
physically carried in the vehicle. Sensing of a vehicle’s
performance and the roadway environment was done solely
by the driver. Today, an increasing number of vehicle
functions are electronic. These functions can be activated and
controlled automatically by electronic control units. Further,
they can rely on electrical inputs from the driver or on
information relayed from on-board sensors. Increasingly,
those on-board sensors monitor vehicle performance and the
roadway environment. The operation of those units can be
substantially altered by post-manufacture software updates.
In addition, advances in communications technology have
made it possible for nomadic devices with vehicle-related
applications to be brought into the vehicle. Furthermore,
devices located outside the vehicle can be used to affect and
even control vehicle functions—including safety ones.
NHTSA’s statutory authority over motor vehicles and
motor vehicle equipment would allow the agency to establish
safety standards applicable to vehicles that are originally
manufactured with autonomous capabilities and to
aftermarket equipment that could be added to vehicles that
were not originally manufactured as autonomous vehicles so
as to convert them into autonomous vehicles.
The Safety Act gives NHTSA authority over new motor
vehicles and motor vehicle equipment. The Act defines a
“motor vehicle” as “a vehicle driven or drawn by mechanical
power and manufactured primarily for use” on public roads.48
The definition of “motor vehicle equipment” is broader and
thus effectively establishes the limit of the agency’s authority
under the Safety Act:
(A) any system, part, or component of a motor vehicle as
originally manufactured;
(B) any similar part or component manufactured or sold
for replacement or improvement of a system, part, or

48. 49 U.S.C. § 30102 (a)(6) (2006). The definition of “motor vehicle”
includes trailers, but generally excludes vehicles that only use public roads for a
limited duration to travel between worksites; vehicles that run exclusively on
rails are also excluded from the definition of motor vehicle. See § 30102 (a)(7)
(“ ‘ [M]otor vehicle’ means a vehicle driven or drawn by mechanical power and
manufactured primarily for use on public streets, roads, and highways, but does
not include a vehicle operated only on a rail line.”).
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component, or as an accessory or addition to a motor
vehicle; or
(C) any device or an article or apparel, including a
motorcycle helmet and excluding medicine or eyeglasses
prescribed by a licensed practitioner, that—
(i) is not a system, part, or component of a motor
vehicle; and
(ii) is manufactured, sold, delivered, or offered to be sold
for use on public streets, roads, and highways with the
apparent purpose of safeguarding users of motor vehicles
against risk of accident, injury, or death.49

NHTSA’s authority to issue safety standards that apply
to new motor vehicles would enable the agency to establish
standards applicable to vehicles that were originally
manufactured with autonomous capabilities.50 This authority
would also extend to the individual pieces of equipment that
are installed in new autonomous vehicles to enable these
vehicles to drive autonomously.51 NHTSA could also establish
safety standards that apply to equipment used to equip
vehicles (not originally manufactured as autonomous
vehicles) with autonomous technology using the agency’s
authority over equipment that is sold as replacements or

49. See § 30102 (a)(7)(C); MAP-21, Pub. Law. 112-141, § 31201, 126 Stat.
405, available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112hr4348enr/pdf/BILLS112hr4348enr.pdf. Congress added subparagraph (C) to the statutory definition
of “motor vehicle equipment” in 1970 when it amended the definition in order to
clarify the Department’s authority over additional objects such as motorcycle
helmets. See S. REP. NO. 91-559, at 5 (1970). However, Congress did not seek
to limit the extension of the Department’s authority only to motorcycle helmets
and instead utilized the broad terms “device, article, and apparel” to describe
the universe of objects that are within the agency’s authority. See id.
Acknowledging the concerns of those who authored the House version of the
amendatory language that utilizing the terms “device, article, and apparel”
might unduly extend the Department’s authority to objects that have only a
tangential relation to motor vehicle safety, the conference committee added a
use restriction. See id. Congress relaxed this use restriction in the statutory
definition of “motor vehicle equipment” as part of the amendments to the Safety
Act in MAP-21. See MAP-21, Pub. Law. 112-141, § 31201, 126 Stat, 405. Thus,
the Department’s regulatory authority under subparagraph (C) is limited to
those devices, articles, or apparel that are used for “the apparent purpose of
safeguarding users of motor vehicles against risk of accident, injury, or death.”
See id. (emphasis added).
50. 49 U.S.C. §§ 30102 (a)(6), 30111.
51. § 30102 (a)(7)(A).

WOOD

2012]

11/14/2012 12:53 AM

POTENTIAL CHALLENGES OF AMVS

1441

improvements to a motor vehicle.52
NHTSA’s authority over these groups of items: (1)
systems, parts, and components installed or included in a
vehicle, (2) replacements and improvements to those systems,
parts and components, and (3) accessories and additions to
motor vehicles is very broad. Their status as motor vehicle
equipment does not depend on the type of technology or its
mode of control (mechanical or electronic) or whether an item
is tangible or intangible.53
Thus, the transition from
mechanical to electromechanical systems has had no
significant effect on the extent of NHTSA’s authority over
motor vehicle performance. NHTSA will continue to have
regulatory authority over all the systems, parts and
components installed on new motor vehicles under the Safety
Act as motor vehicle control systems become increasingly
electronic and then increasingly automated.
A. Motor Vehicles Originally Manufactured as Autonomous
Vehicles
This part of the definition of “motor vehicle equipment”
includes all systems, parts, and components that are installed
in or accompany a motor vehicle as it is originally
manufactured.54 In essence, this authorizes the agency to
regulate anything that is included with the motor vehicle at
the time it is produced for sale to a member of the public.
“System, part, or component” is broad language that
encompasses a large universe of items that can be considered
52. § 30102 (a)(7)(B).
53. See,
e.g.,
Drive-by-Wire™
Throttle
System,
HONDA,
http://automobiles.honda.com/crosstour/features.aspx?Feature=dbw (last visited
Oct. 9, 2012) (detailing the drive-by-wire system currently available on the
Honda Crosstour). An example of an electromechanical system is a drive-bywire system, which is currently used in various vehicle models. Id. It
substitutes electronic linkages and electromechanical actuators for the
traditional mechanical linkages between driver controls (steering wheel, brake
pedal, and accelerator pedal) and the associated vehicle operating systems. Id.
Instead of the driver’s hands turning the steering wheel, which in turn could
move a rack and pinion mechanical link to the wheels, the driver’s turning of
the steering wheel would send an electrical command to the wheels and the
vehicle would turn the wheels accordingly. Id. NHTSA would consider such a
system, including the electrical signals used to relay commands, to be motor
vehicle equipment.
54. “Motor vehicle equipment means—any system, part, or component of a
motor vehicle as originally manufactured.” § 30102 (a)(7)(A).
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motor vehicle equipment.55
The agency has already given some consideration to the
application of subparagraph (A) of the definition of “motor
vehicle equipment” to novel technologies. A recent example of
a new technology that the agency has considered to be an
item of motor vehicle equipment is an in-vehicle
communications system (such as OnStar).56
OnStar is
available on many new General Motors models. As an item
that is usually57 installed as original equipment for the
purposes of providing various functions, such as emergency
notification and turn-by-turn navigation,58 the device is
considered by the agency to be a system, part, or component
installed in motor vehicles as originally manufactured. As
discussed above, sensors and other equipment that allow
autonomous technology to function would be considered
“motor vehicle equipment” by virtue of these items’ being
installed in a new motor vehicle at the time of manufacture
(in the same manner as OnStar).
B. Aftermarket Autonomous Technologies
The definition of “motor vehicle equipment” also gives
great breadth to NHTSA’s authority to issue safety standards
and the manufacturers’ obligation to recall noncompliant or
defective equipment and devices that are not part of the

55. A system is “a regularly interacting or interdependent group of items
forming a unified whole . . . : a group of devices or artificial objects or an
organization forming a network especially for distributing something or serving
a common purpose.”
System, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/system (last visited Oct. 9, 2012). A part is “one of the
often indefinite or unequal subdivisions into which something is or is regarded
as divided and which together constitute the whole.” Part, MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/part (last visited Oct. 9, 2012). A
component is “a constituent part: INGREDIENT.” Component, MERRIAMWEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/component?show=0&t=
1337029662 (last visited Oct. 9, 2012).
56. See Letter from Anthony M. Cooke, Chief Counsel, NHTSA to Ashley G.
Alley, Office of General Counsel, Gov’t Accountability Office (July 19, 2007),
available at http://isearch.nhtsa.gov/files/GAO%20telematics%20Sept%2013
.htm.
57. OnStar is currently available as an aftermarket device. See Althea
Chang, Aftermarket OnStar Available to Non-GM Vehicles on Sunday,
FORBES.COM (July 23, 2011, 5:55 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/altheachang/
2011/07/23/aftermarket-onstar-available-to-non-gm-vehicles-on-sunday/.
58. See id.
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vehicle as originally manufactured, but are purchased by
motor vehicle users in the after-market.59 The agency’s
jurisdiction over after-market equipment is significant in
regard to autonomous driving technologies because providers
of advanced crash avoidance and autonomous driving
technologies might wish to market these technologies for
installation on used vehicles. Further, any after-market
software updates to the autonomous driving system or
software enabling other devices to connect to the autonomous
driving system would be considered “motor vehicle
equipment” under this part of the definition.
The statutory language separates the items covered by
this part of the definition into two groups: (1) those that are a
“replacement or improvement” and (2) those that are an
“accessory or addition.” Thus, for discussion purposes, we
have restated subparagraph (B) of the statutory definition to
aid readers in understanding the criteria that govern the
determination of whether an item qualifies as a “replacement
or improvement” or as an “accessory or addition.”
As
restated, subparagraph (B) reads:
(B) any similar part or component manufactured or sold
 for replacement or improvement of a system, part,
or component, or
 as an accessory or addition to a motor vehicle;

The following paragraphs will discuss each of the above
groups of items and the associated requirements from the
statutory text. It is important to note that, while the criteria
for those items over which NHTSA possesses regulatory
authority by virtue of subparagraph (B) of the definition of
“motor vehicle equipment” are different from the criteria for
items that fall under subparagraph (A) of the definition,60
both subparagraph (A) and (B) begin with the same pool of
items (system, parts, or components).61 In essence, NHTSA
59. See § 30102 (a)(7)(B) (covering replacements, improvements, accessories,
and additions).
60. Part (A) restricts system, parts, and components by the time during
which they are attached to motor vehicle. See § 30102 (a)(7)(A). Part (B) has
different restrictions as will be discussed in the paragraphs that follow. See §
30102 (a)(7)(B).
61. Part (A) defines the universe of objects as “system, parts, or
components,” while part (B) begins with “similar parts or components.” § 30102
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possesses regulatory authority under subparagraph (A) of the
definition of “motor vehicle equipment” over items that are
systems, parts, or components on new motor vehicles.62
Subparagraph (B) of the definition of “motor vehicle
equipment” gives NHTSA regulatory authority over the same
or similar systems, parts, or components sold in the
aftermarket and installed in used vehicles.63
1. Replacements and Improvements
An autonomous driving system would be considered
motor vehicle equipment regardless of whether it is offered to
consumers as original equipment on a new motor vehicle or as
an after-market replacement of or improvement to original
equipment. NHTSA’s regulatory authority over items that
are sold as “replacement[s] or improvement[s] of a system,
part, or component” allows the agency to regulate
autonomous technology installed as aftermarket equipment.64
Installing autonomous technology on a vehicle that was not
originally manufactured as an autonomous vehicle would
necessitate extensive modification to the vehicle.65 The items
used to convert a used vehicle to an autonomous vehicle
would be considered improvements to a motor vehicle.66
This part of the definition of “motor vehicle equipment” is
also applicable to software installed on vehicles.
For
example, a manufacturer could issue software updates for
existing autonomous driving systems. Regardless of where
the software is located (i.e., on what type of hardware), the

(a)(7)(A)–(B). As most all parts of a vehicle can need replacement, it does not
seem accurate to consider the “replacements,” “improvements,” “accessories,” or
“additions,” in part (B) to be a narrower set of objects as in part (A). See id.
62. § 30102 (a)(7)(A).
63. § 30102 (a)(7)(B).
64. Id.
65. See Sebastian Thrun & Chris Urmson, Keynote Presentation at IROS
2011 (Sept. 29, 2011), available at http://www.youtube.com/watch
?v=z7ub5Doyapk (explaining how the Google self-driving car achieves
autonomous driving). The Google self-driving car offers an example of the
extensive modifications that would be necessary to convert a vehicle that was
not originally manufactured as an autonomous vehicle to one capable of
autonomous driving. See id.
66. § 30102 (a)(7)(B). It is likely that items used to convert a vehicle that
was not originally manufactured as an autonomous vehicle to one capable of
autonomous operation could also qualify as additions to a motor vehicle. See id.
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software itself would be subject to the Safety Act and could be
subject to a safety standard should there be a sufficient safety
need for one. If a software update were delivered to a
consumer (such as updated maps or enhanced decisionmaking algorithms), the software itself would be considered a
replacement or improvement under the first half of
subparagraph (B) of the definition.
2. Accessories and Additions
Items that are considered “motor vehicle equipment”
because they are accessories or additions to motor vehicles
differ from the items we have discussed above. Unlike items
that are considered to be replacements or additions, items
that are considered to be accessories or additions are not
necessarily as closely related to the systems, parts and
components originally installed in new motor vehicles (in the
sense that these items potentially do not duplicate the
functions of original equipment).
The dictionary definition of “addition” seems to imply
that an “addition” to the motor vehicle is an item that
becomes united or joined with a motor vehicle.67 In other
words, it is not an item which can be freely carried into and
out of the vehicle.
The dictionary definition of “accessory” states that an
accessory is a secondary item which adds some value or
function (such as additional convenience or effectiveness) to
the original item.68
While such a definition does not
contemplate that an item’s becoming a part of (or physically
attached) to the motor vehicle in order to be regarded as an
accessory (as such an interpretation would make “accessory”
duplicative of the term “addition”), this definition does seem
to imply some sort of use of the item in conjunction with the
67. An addition is “a part added (as to a building or residential section)” and
add means “to join or unite so as to bring about an increase or improvement.”
Addition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
addition
(last
visited
Oct.
9,
2012);
Add,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/add (last visited Oct. 9, 2012).
68. An accessory can be “a thing of secondary or subordinate importance:
ADJUNCT” or “an object or device not essential in itself but adding to the
beauty, convenience, or effectiveness of something else.” Accessory, MERRIAMWEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/accessory (last visited
Oct. 9, 2012).
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motor vehicle. Thus, an item could be an “accessory” under
subparagraph (B) of the statutory definition of “motor vehicle
equipment” if a substantial portion of its expected use were in
conjunction with motor vehicles.69
Given that a system, part, or component might be
intangible and electronic, and given that an item can be an
accessory to a motor vehicle under subparagraph (B) as long
as a substantial portion of its expected use is in conjunction
with a motor vehicle, certain types of software can be
regarded as an accessory and thus are “motor vehicle
equipment.” For example, a software application that could
be installed on a cell phone for the purpose of enabling the
phone user to perform such vehicle-related functions as
starting/stopping or locking/unlocking a motor vehicle
through manipulating the controls on the phone would be
considered an accessory to the motor vehicle even if the cell
phone itself is not.70
Other applications can perform
69. One practical consideration in the agency’s deciding whether to exercise
this authority with respect to a particular type of object would be whether
another federal agency was authorized, able and inclined to regulate the safety
of that object effectively.
70. Our conclusion that software can be an item of motor vehicle equipment
is reinforced by the recent enactment of MAP-21. In that Act, Congress
implicitly recognized this fact when it directed NHTSA to examine the need for
safety standards with regard to electronic systems in passenger motor vehicles.
See Pub. L. No.112-141, §§ 31401-02, 126 Stat. 405. Separately, NHTSA is not
the only agency contemplating how its statutory authority may apply to
software. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is also considering
adopting an interpretation of its statutory authority that would subject software
installed on mobile devices to regulation under the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C §§ 301 et seq. (2006). See Draft Guidance for Industry
and Food and Drug Administration Staff; Mobile Medical Applications;
Availability, 76 Fed. Reg. 43689 (July 21, 2011) [hereinafter FDA Draft
Guidance] (announcing the availability of the FDA’s proposed application of the
agency’s regulatory authority to software applications installed on mobile
devices), available at https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2011/07/21/201118537/draft-guidance-for-industry-and-food-and-drug-administration-staffmobile-medical-applications. The FDA’s draft guidance would treat software
installed on mobile devices as a regulated device under the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C §§ 301 et seq. (2006), if the software met the
definition of “device” contained in the Act and is either “used as an accessory to
a regulated medical device or transforms a mobile platform into a regulated
medical device.” FDA Draft Guidance, supra. The term “device” is defined in
the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, as:
an instrument, apparatus, implement, machine, contrivance, implant,
in vitro reagent, or other similar or related article, including any
component, part, or accessory, which is . . . recognized in the official
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functions related to on-road vehicle operation. An example is
a software application that uses the camera function on a
smart phone placed on a vehicle’s dashboard to detect and
recognize vehicles on the road ahead and provide forward
collision warnings.
IV. SAFETY STANDARDS: STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS AND
ADDRESSABLE ASPECTS OF PERFORMANCE
While NHTSA’s authority over autonomous driving
systems is quite broad, the agency is still faced with the
challenge of determining the appropriate instances for and
effective ways of regulating autonomous driving technologies
(whether functioning individually or in combination) using
the existing statutory framework. Under the Safety Act,
NHTSA’s standards must be performance-oriented.71
Further, the standards are required to be practicable,
objective, and meet the need for safety.72 This section does
not attempt a comprehensive identification and resolution of
the possible regulatory issues that can arise with the advent
of increasingly complex autonomous driving technologies.
Instead, it attempts to illustrate possible regulatory
challenges and their solutions by first providing an overview
of the current statutory framework for establishing standards
and then applying that framework to a few technical areas

National Formulary, or the United States Pharmacopeia, or any
supplement to them, [] intended for use in the diagnosis of disease or
other conditions, or in the cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of
disease, in man or other animals, or [] intended to affect the structure
or any function of the body of man or other animals, and which does
not achieve its primary intended purposes through chemical action
within or on the body of man or other animals and which is not
dependent upon being metabolized for the achievement of its primary
intended purpose.
21 U.S.C. § 321(h) (2006).
71. See 49 U.S.C. § 30102(a)(8) (defining “motor vehicle safety” as “the
performance of a motor vehicle . . . in a way that protects the public against
unreasonable risk of accidents occurring because of the design, construction, or
performance of a motor vehicle”); see § 30102(a)(9) (defining “motor vehicle
safety standard” as “a minimum standard for motor vehicle or motor vehicle
equipment performance.” See S. REP. NO. 89-1301, at 2713–14 (1966) (stating
that motor vehicle standards issued by NHTSA should specify a minimum level
of safety performance).
72. See 49 U.S.C. § 30111(a) (establishing requirements for NHTSA to
follow when issuing motor vehicle safety standards).
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with foreseeable regulatory issues. The technical areas
examined in this section include the following:
 Minimum Standards and Testing for Software
Performance: As vehicle systems employ artificial
intelligence to accomplish multiple (or all) driving
tasks, how can the agency help to ensure that the
autonomous driving systems accomplish their tasks in
a reliable, accurate, and timely fashion?
 Security and Privacy of Vehicle Systems: Public
acceptance and activation of autonomous driving
technologies will depend substantially on the ability of
those technologies to perform reliably and safely and
without compromising the privacy of drivers. As
autonomous driving systems will be increasingly
integrated with other devices through wireless
interfaces, how can the agency help to protect vehicle
systems from malicious hacking and tampering? In
addition, how can it help protect the information
received, generated and sent by autonomous vehicles
and ensure that drivers may freely move without being
tracked?
 User Interfaces with Autonomous Driving Systems: As
some vehicle systems might become automated before
others, some communication between the vehicle and
the driver about those automated systems would be
necessary. How can the agency help to ensure that the
driver has a proper understanding of whether the
vehicle is responsible or whether the driver is
responsible for any given driving task at any given
moment?

With these questions in mind, this section attempts to
illustrate the challenges confronting NHTSA in addressing
these safety issues using performance standards that are
both objective and practicable. During the course of this
analysis, we conclude that (although additional research
might be required) many of NHTSA’s current approaches to
writing performance requirements and test procedures that
address real world scenarios can be effectively applied to
autonomous driving technologies. Further, we note that
connected vehicles and autonomous motor vehicles are
closely-related (but distinct) concepts, and thus many of the
challenges in regulating autonomous motor vehicles and
connected motor vehicles are quite similar.
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A. Requirements and Considerations Applicable to Safety
Standards
1. Performance-Oriented
NHTSA’s regulatory authority would allow the agency to
issue safety standards that regulate the performance of
autonomous vehicles. While NHTSA is directed to establish
performance standards, the case law and the legislative
history indicate that when necessary to promote safety,
NHTSA can be quite specific in drafting its performance
standards and may require or preclude the installation of
certain equipment. In the Safety Act, the Secretary is
directed to issue motor vehicle safety standards. “Motor
vehicle safety standards” are defined as “minimum
standard[s] for motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment
performance.”73 The cases have reinforced this concept by
determining that NHTSA is “generally charged”74 with
setting performance standards, instead of becoming directly
involved in questions of design.75 The legislative history
further illustrates that NHTSA’s standards are to “[specify]
the required minimum safe performance of vehicles but not
the manner in which the manufacturer is to achieve the
specified performance.” 76 An example cited in the legislative
history points to “a building code which specifies the
minimum load-carrying characteristics of the structural
members of a building wall, but leaves the builder free to
choose his own materials and design.”77
Although the Safety Act directs NHTSA to issue
performance standards, Congress understood that the agency
may preclude certain designs through these performance
standards. “Motor vehicle safety,” is defined in the Safety Act
as the performance of a motor vehicle in a way that protects
the public from unreasonable risks of accident due to (among
other things) the design of the motor vehicle.78 The legislative
73. Id.; see also § 30102 (a)(9) (emphasis added).
74. Washington v. Dept. of Transp., 84 F.3d 1222, 1224 (10th Cir. 1996)
(citations omitted).
75. Id. at 1224 (citations omitted).
76. S. REP. NO. 89-1301, at 2713–14 (1966).
77. Id.
78. See § 30102(a)(8) (“ ‘ Motor vehicle safety’ means the performance of a
motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment in a way that protects the public
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history is clear that this language is not intended to afford
the agency the authority to promulgate design standards,
“but merely to clarify that the public is to be protected from
inherently dangerous designs which conflict with the concept
of motor vehicle safety.”79 This clarification is evidence that
Congress recognized that performance standards inevitably
have an impact on the design of a motor vehicle.80
The courts have further elaborated on the framework
established by Congress and have recognized that, when
necessary to achieve a safety purpose, NHTSA can be quite
specific in establishing performance standards even if certain
designs will be precluded. For example, the Sixth Circuit
found that an agency provision permitting rectangular
headlamps, but only if they were of certain specified
dimensions, was not an invalid design restriction and
“serve[d] to ensure proper headlamp performance,” reasoning
that “the overall safety and reliability of a headlamp system
depends to a certain extent upon the wide availability of
replacement lamps, which in turn depends upon
standardization.”81 Thus, the court found it permissible for
the agency to establish very specific requirements for
headlamps even though it would restrict design flexibility.82
Further, the cases indicate that NHTSA can establish
standards to require the installation of certain specific
equipment on vehicles and establish performance standards
for that equipment. For example, the Tenth Circuit found in
Washington v. DOT that “NHTSA’s regulatory authority
extends beyond the performance of motor vehicles per se, to
particular items of equipment.”83 In that case, the validity of
NHTSA’s Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS)
against unreasonable risk of accidents occurring because of the design,
construction, or performance of a motor vehicle.”).
79. See H.R. REP. NO. 89-1919, at 2732 (1966).
80. Courts have also recognized this truth. See Chrysler Corp. v. Dept. of
Transp., 515 F.2d 1053, 1058–59 (6th Cir. 1975); see also Washington, 84 F.3d
at 1224 (stating “the performance-design distinction is much easier to state in
the abstract than to apply definitively-so . . . . This is particularly true when,
due to contingent relationships between performance requirements and design
options, specification of the former effectively entails, or severely constrains, the
latter.”).
81. Chrysler Corp., 515 F.2d at 1058–59.
82. See id.
83. Washington, 84 F.3d at 1222, 1225 (citations omitted).
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No. 121 requiring ABS systems on air-braked vehicles was
challenged as “imposing design specifications rather than
performance criteria.”84 The court’s conclusion was based not
only on the fact that prior courts had upheld NHTSA’s
standards requiring particular equipment,85 but also on the
fact that Congress had recognized NHTSA’s former
rulemakings and left NHTSA’s authority unchanged when it
codified the Safety Act in 1994.86
Thus, in summary, NHTSA is required to issue
performance standards when regulating motor vehicles and
motor vehicle equipment. However, NHTSA is able to be
quite specific in establishing performance standards and may
preclude certain designs that are contrary to the interests of
safety. Further, NHTSA may require the installation of
certain equipment and establish performance standards for
that equipment.
2. Meeting the Need for Safety
As required by the Safety Act, standards issued by the
agency must “meet the need for motor vehicle safety.”87 As
“motor vehicle safety” is defined in the statute as protecting
the public against “unreasonable risk” of accidents, death, or
injury,88 the case law indicates that there must be a nexus
between the safety problem and the standard.89 However, a
84. Id. at 1223.
85. See id. at 1225 (citing Chrysler Corp. v. Rhodes, 416 F.2d 319, 3222,
3222 n.4) (1st Cir. 1969) (“motor vehicles are required to have specific items of
equipment . . . these enumerated items of equipment are subject to specific
performance standards,” including lamps and reflective devices requiring
“specific items of equipment”); Wood v. Gen. Motors Corp., 865 F.2d 395, 417
(1st Cir. 1988) (“requiring seat belts or passive restraints . . . has elements of a
design standard”); Automotive Parts & Accessories Ass’n v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330,
332 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (“factory equipped . . . head restraints which meet specific
federal standards”).
86. See Washington, 84 F.3d at 1225.
87. See 49 U.S.C. § 30111(a).
88. 49 U.S.C. § 30102(a)(8) (2006) (emphasis added).
89. See, e.g., National Tire Dealers Ass’n v. Brinegar, 491 F.2d 31, 35–37
(D.C. Cir. 1974) (stating that the administrative record did not support a
significant nexus between motor vehicle safety and requiring retread tires to
have permanent labels because there was no showing that a second-hand owner
would be dependent on these labels and no showing as to how often such
situations would arise); see also H&H Tire Co. v. Dept. of Transp., 471 F.2d 350,
354–55 (7th Cir. 1972) (expressing doubt that the standard met the need for
safety because there was little evidence that the required compliance tests
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standard need not address safety by direct means.
In upholding NHTSA’s authority to issue a safety
standard requiring standardized vehicle identification
numbers (VINs), the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals found
that a FMVSS requiring VINs met the need for motor vehicle
safety by such indirect means as reducing errors in compiling
statistical data on motor vehicle crashes (in order to aid
research to understand current safety problems and support
future standards, to increase the efficiency of vehicle recall
campaigns, and to assist in tracing stolen vehicles).90
3. Objective
A standard is objective if it specifies test procedures that
are “capable of producing identical results when test
conditions are exactly duplicated” and performance
requirements whose satisfaction is “based upon the readings
obtained from measuring instruments as opposed to the
subjective opinions.”91 The requirement that standards be
stated in objective terms matches the overall statutory
scheme requiring that manufacturers self-certify that their
motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment are in compliance
with the relevant FMVSSs.92 In order for this statutory
scheme to work, the agency and the manufacturer must be
able to obtain the same result from identical tests in order to
objectively determine the validity of the manufacturer’s
certification.93
Using those two elements of objectivity (capable of
producing identical results and compliance based on
measurements not subjective opinion), the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals found that the test procedure in question in
early version of FMVSS No. 208 was not objective because the
test dummy specified in the standard for use in compliance

would ensure that retreaded tires would be capable of performing safely under
modern driving conditions).
90. See Vehicle Equip. Safety Comm’n v. NHTSA, 611 F. 2d 53, 54 (4th Cir.
1979).
91. See Chrysler Corp. v. Dept. of Transp., 472 F.2d 659, 676. See also
Paccar, Inc. v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 573 F.2d 632, 644 (9th Cir.
1978).
92. See 49 U.S.C. § 30115(a) (2006).
93. See Chrysler Corp., 472 F.2d at 675.
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testing did not give consistent and repeatable results.94 The
court in this case was unconvinced that the standard met the
objectivity requirements even though NHTSA based its test
procedure on a test dummy in a voluntary automotive
industry standard (Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE)
Recommended Practice J963). The court rejected NHTSA’s
explanation that, although J963 “may not provide totally
reproducible results,”95 “dummies conforming to the SAE
specifications are the most complete and satisfactory ones
presently available.”96 Further, the court rejected NHTSA’s
reasoning that, in the event that the agency’s test results
were different from those of the manufacturers because of the
difference in the test dummies, NHTSA’s test results would
not be used to find non-compliance,97 stating that “there is no
room for an [ ] agency investigation [ ] in this procedure” that
enable the agency to compare results of differing tests.98
Other courts have also reached similar conclusions. The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, relying on the same
reasoning adopted by the Sixth Circuit, found that a
compliance road test specifying the use of surfaces specifically
rated with quantifiable numbers (defining the “slickness” of
the surfaces) was objective despite “[t]he fact that it is
difficult to create and thereafter maintain a road surface with
a particular coefficient of friction does not render the specified

94. The court stated,
The record supports the conclusions that the test procedures and the
test device specified . . . are not objective in at least the following
respects: (1) The absence of an adequate flexibility criteria for the
dummy’s neck; the existing specifications permit the neck to be very
stiff, or very flexible, or somewhere in between, significantly affecting
the resultant forces measured on the dummy’s head. (2) Permissible
variations in the test procedure for determining thorax dynamic spring
rate (force deflection characteristics on the dummy’s chest) permit
considerable latitude in chest construction which could produce wide
variations in maximum chest deceleration between two different
dummies, each of which meets the literal requirements of SAE J963.
(3) The absence of specific, objective specifications for construction of
the dummy’s head permits significant variation in forces imparted to
the accelerometer by which performance is to be measured.
See id. at 676–78.
95. See id. at 677.
96. See id.
97. Id. at 677–78.
98. Id. at 678–79.
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coefficient any less objective.”99 In this case, both NHTSA
and the manufacturer would perform road tests on surfaces
with identically rated friction coefficients.100 In a later case,
the Sixth Circuit upheld NHTSA’s decision not to incorporate
a test suggested by a commenter for wheelchair
crashworthiness performed with a “test seat” which “shall be
capable of resisting significant deformation during a test” as
not sufficiently objective.101 In the absence of language
quantifying how much deformation is significant, terms such
as “significant deformation” do not provide enough specificity
to remove the subjective element from the compliance
determination process.
4. Practicable
In general, the practicability of a given standard involves
a number of considerations.
The majority of issues
concerning the practicability of a standard arise out of
whether the standard is technologically and economically
feasible. An additional issue is whether the means used by
manufacturers to comply with a standard will be accepted
and correctly used by the public.
i.

Technological Practicability

Significant technical uncertainties in meeting a standard
might lead a court to find that a standard is not practicable.
For example, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld
NHTSA’s decision to amend FMVSS No. 222 to include
requirements for wheelchair securement and occupant
restraint on school buses with a static102 compliance test
instead of a dynamic test,103 noting that the administrative
99. See Paccar, Inc. v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 573 F.2d 632,
644 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 862 (1978).
100. See id. (stating that the “skid number method of testing braking
capacity meets the [objectivity] definition. Identical results will ensue when
test conditions are exactly duplicated. The procedure is rational and decisively
demonstrable. Compliance is based on objective measures of stopping distances
rather than on the subjective opinions of human beings.”).
101. Simms v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 45 F.3d 999, 1007–08
(6th Cir. 1995).
102. Static testing tests the strength of individual components of the
wheelchair separately, while dynamic testing subjects the entire wheelchair to
simulated real-world crash conditions. See Simms, 45 F.3d at 1001.
103. See id. at 1006–08.
Petitioners argued that NHTSA had acted
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record showed that this particular dynamic test was
underdeveloped and had many unresolved technical
problems.104 The court noted that it is not practicable “[t]o
attempt to fashion rules in an area in which many technical
problems have been identified and no consensus exists for
their resolution . . . .”105 In another example, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals found a compliance test procedure
using a specified friction (“slickness”) coefficient to be
impracticable due to technical difficulties in maintaining the
specific slickness test condition. As mentioned above, the
Ninth Circuit found the specified coefficient test condition to
be objective.106 However, the court found that this standard
was not practicable due to the technical difficulties in
maintaining this specific test condition. Thus, the cases show
that when significant technical uncertainties and difficulties
exist in a standard promulgated by NHTSA, those portions of
the standard can be considered impracticable under the
Safety Act.
However, the requirement that standards
be
technologically feasible does not require that the technology
to be used to comply with a new standard be fully developed
and tested when the standard is promulgated. The Sixth

unlawfully in promulgating standards for the securement of wheelchairs on
school buses based only on “static” instead of “dynamic” testing. Id. Static
testing tests the strength of the individual components of a securement device.
See id. Dynamic testing is a full systems approach that measures the forces
experienced by a human surrogate (test dummy) in simulated crash that
replicates real world conditions and assesses the combined performance of the
vehicle and the securement device. See id.
104. Id. at 1005–07. NHTSA agreed that dynamic testing is the preferred
approach (because it more fully and accurately replicates the real world
conditions in which the desired safety performance is to be provided), but
explained that it was not practicable at that time to adopt dynamic testing
because there was:
(1) [N]eed to develop an appropriate test dummy; (2) need to identify
human tolerance levels for a handicapped child; (3) need to establish
test conditions; (4) need to select a “standard” or surrogate wheelchair;
(5) need to establish procedures for placing the wheelchair and test
dummy in an effective test condition; and (6) need to develop an
appropriate test buck to represent a portion of the school bus body for
securement and anchorages.
Id. at 1005.
105. Id. at 1010–11.
106. Paccar, Inc. v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 573 F.2d 632, 644
(9th Cir. 1978).
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Circuit upheld a NHTSA standard requiring “Complete
Passive Protection,” that includes the required use of airbags
as standard equipment, by a future date, rejecting petitioner’s
contention that standards cannot require nonexistent
technology.107 Relying on the legislative history of the Safety
Act, the court found that the agency “is empowered to issue
safety standards which require improvements in existing
technology or which require the development of new
technology, and is not limited to issuing standards based fully
on devices already fully developed.”108
Thus, while
technological feasibility is a significant part of determining
whether a given standard can be considered practicable, the
agency is fully empowered to issue technology-driving
standards when it is appropriate to do so.
ii. Economic Practicability
A standard can be considered impracticable by the courts
due to economic infeasibility. This consideration primarily
involves the costs imposed by a standard.109 In the instances
in which a court has been called upon to assess whether a
standard is economically feasible, typically with respect to an
industry composed largely of relatively small businesses, the
courts have asked whether or not the cost would be so
107. See Chrysler Corp. v. Dept. of Transp., 472 F.2d 659, 666, 671–75 (6th
Cir. 1972). Stages one and two required vehicle manufactures to provide
“Complete Passive Protection,” or one of two other options on vehicles
manufactured between January 1, 1972, and August 14, 1973, for stage one,
and after August 15, 1972, stage two. See id. at 666–67. Stage 3, requiring
solely “Complete Passive Protection” was required by August 15, 1975. Id. at
667.
108. Id. at 673. In making its decision, the court stated
[I]t is clear from the Act and its legislative history that the Agency may
issue standards requiring future levels of motor vehicle performance
which manufacturers could not meet unless they diverted more of their
resources to producing additional safety technology than they might
otherwise do. This distinction is one committed to the Agency’s
discretion, and any hardships which might result from the adoption of
a standard requiring . . . a great degree of developmental research, can
be ameliorated by the Agency under . . . . The section [that] allows the
Secretary to extend the effective date beyond the usual statutory
maximum of one year from the date of issuance, as he has done [here].
Id. at 673.
109. See, e.g., Nat’l Truck Equip. Ass’n v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety
Admin., 919 F.2d 1148, 1153–54 (6th Cir. 1990); Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Peck,
751 F.2d 1336, 1343 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (panel opinion by Circuit Judge Scalia).
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prohibitive that it could cause significant harm to a wellestablished industry. In essence, this consideration generally
establishes a non-quantified outer limit of the costs that can
be reasonably imposed upon regulated entities. If compliance
with the standard is so burdensome, i.e., costly, so as to
create a significant harm to a well-established industry,
courts have generally found that the standard is
impracticable in its application to that industry.
iii. Public Acceptance and Use
Finally, a standard might not be considered practicable if
the public were not expected to accept and correctly use the
technologies installed in compliance with the standard.
When considering passive restraints such as automatic
seatbelts, the D.C. Circuit stated that “the agency cannot
fulfill its statutory responsibility [in regard to practicability]
unless it considers popular reaction.”110 While the agency
argued in that case that public acceptance is not one of the
statutory criteria that the agency must apply, the court
disagreed.111
The court reasoned that, “without public
cooperation there can be no assurance that a safety system
can ‘meet the need for motor vehicle safety.’ ” 112 Thus, as a
part of the agency’s considerations, a standard issued by the
agency will not be considered practicable if the technologies
installed pursuant to the standard are so unpopular that
there is no assurance of sufficient public cooperation to meet
the safety need that the standard seeks to address.113
B. Autonomous Performance: Minimum Standards and
Methods of Ensuring Compliance
As we have mentioned above, autonomous driving
systems can employ a variety of hardware (such as
sensors/cameras/communications devices) and complex
110. See Pac. Legal Found. v. Dept. of Transp., 593 F.2d 1338, 1345–46 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 830 (1979).
111. See id.
112. See id.
113. Pursuant to concerns about public acceptance of various seat belt
designs, NHTSA issued a final rule in 1981 adding seat belt comfort and
convenience requirements to Standard No. 208, Occupant Crash Protection.
Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Improvement of Seat Belt Assemblies,
46 Fed. Reg. 2064 (Jan. 8, 1981) (codified at 49 C.F.R. 571).
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software—capable of assisting or even replacing the driver’s
senses and intelligence—for an increasing number of driving
tasks. Today, vehicles are already beginning to incorporate
software designed to issue warnings to the driver regarding
conditions (e.g., potential crashes with other vehicles) in the
immediate surrounding area or even automatically brake the
vehicle on behalf of the driver to avoid or at least mitigate
potential crashes.114 NHTSA will need to develop methods of
ensuring a minimum level of safety performance, as it does
for more traditional automotive technologies, if it determines
that any of these technologies lead to a significant safety
benefit or have potential to create safety issues.
This task will become increasingly complex as
autonomous driving systems are designed for the potentially
limitless variety of real-world stimuli, conditions, and
scenarios. In response to these factors, a vehicle’s sensors
must acquire the appropriate information, its software must
intelligently interpret this information, and the vehicle must
take the appropriate and timely actions. In response to
general concerns about increasingly capable and complex
electronic systems, NHTSA arranged for the National
Academy of Sciences (NAS) to conduct a study and make
recommendations for addressing the challenges posed by
those systems. NAS’s report recommends that NHTSA
become more familiar with and proactive in responding to
those complex challenges.115 The report highlights many of
the same challenges in regulating electronic control systems
discussed in this Article.116 The report also contains several
114. See, e.g., Reward 2010 - Mercedes-Benz PRE-SAFE Brake, EURO NCAP,
http://www.euroncap.com/rewards/mercedes_benz_pre_safe_brake.aspx
(last
visited Oct. 9, 2012) (describing briefly the Mercedes-Benz PRE-SAFE system—
available on the E-Class—as a system which issues warnings and is able to
brake autonomously in certain situations).
115. See Press Release, Nat’l Acad. of Sci., Unintended Acceleration
Controversy Reveals Need for NHTSA to Anticipate Safety Challenges From
Automotive Electronics, Says New Report (Jan. 18, 2012), available at
http://www8.nationalacademies.org/onpinews/newsitem.aspx?RecordID=13342.
116. See generally TRANSP. RESEARCH BD., THE SAFETY PROMISES AND
CHALLENGES OF AUTOMOTIVE ELECTRONICS: INSIGHTS FROM UNINTENDED
ACCELERATION
117–34
(2012),
available
at
http://www.nap.edu/
catalog.php?record_id=13342 (describing the extent to which electronic control
systems are incorporated into new vehicles and recommending strategies to
improve the safety of electronic systems in motor vehicles). The Transportation
Research Board is an affiliate of the National Academy of Sciences. Id. at iii.
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recommendations to NHTSA regarding the agency’s efforts to
ensure the safety of electronic control systems.117 NHTSA is
reviewing these recommendations and will consider how
adopting the recommendations could improve the way in
which NHTSA seeks to ensure the safety of these systems.118
While NHTSA will seek to conduct additional research in the
area of electronics, many of the methods NHTSA currently
uses to help to ensure that its standards adequately promote
safety under real world conditions will still be applicable to
these technologies.119
1. Technical Issue: Ensuring that Autonomous Motor
Vehicles Can Handle a Broad Array of RealWorld Driving Conditions
In earlier sections of this Article, we discussed the idea of
a continuum of autonomous driving technologies.
We
recognized in that section that the implementation of
autonomous driving technologies will likely be implemented
in stages, thus allowing the vehicle to assume progressively
more driving tasks over time. With warning systems and
other advanced crash avoidance technologies (such as forward
collision warning and automatic emergency braking), the
vehicle software is performing relatively simple functions
because it has comparatively less responsibility.
For
example, with a crash imminent braking or a forward
collision warning system, the vehicle software is only
required to detect the vehicle in front and warn the driver (or
intervene with braking) when the distance to the forward
vehicle decreases at a rate greater than a certain threshold,
indicating that a collision is likely.

117. Id.
118. Press Release, Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., NHTSA Statement
on NAS Report on Electronic Control Systems (Jan. 18, 2012), available at
http://www.nhtsa.gov/About+NHTSA/Press+Releases/2012/NHTSA+Statement+
on+NAS+Report+on+Electronic+Control+Systems.
119. Several of the recommendations contained in National Academy of
Science report on electronic control systems pertained to increasing NHTSA’s
familiarity with manufacturers’ quality assurance processes and technical
expertise in automotive electronics. See TRANSP. RESEARCH BD., supra note
116, at 117–34 (recommending strategies for NHTSA to regulate the safety of
electronic control systems).
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These calculations are relatively simple and made under
controlled circumstances.
While it is never completely
straightforward to construct an objective and practicable
standard which adequately anticipates and incorporates the
appropriate test variables, one can imagine a standard that
requires manufacturers to certify that their vehicles have
collision braking when tested under controlled conditions on a
test track. Such a test procedure could require, for example,
that when a vehicle is proceeding at 50 mph on a straight test
track and encounters a 40 mph lead vehicle in the same lane
on the test track, it automatically reduces its speed to match
that of the 40 mph lead vehicle. Additional test scenarios
might also be specified to help to ensure that the vehicle can
adequately respond under various emergency braking
situations.
One scenario might, for example, utilize a
completely stationary lead vehicle in the same lane. Another
scenario might utilize a vehicle rapidly decelerating from fifty
mph to zero mph. The test conditions under each of these
scenarios would need to be defined in great detail in order to
help to ensure that the results are consistent when the test
conditions are duplicated.
Collision imminent braking and forward collision
warning are merely one small set of functions that contribute
toward achieving a motor vehicle with full automation. In
order to ensure that a motor vehicle with full automation
provides an appropriate level of minimum performance, the
agency’s test or tests might need to evaluate the vehicle’s
software decision-making in many different potential crash
scenarios.
2. Potential Solution: Supplementing Track Tests with
Diagnostic Tools to Evaluate Vehicles in a Wide
Range of Scenarios
One potential solution for ensuring that NHTSA’s
performance standards adequately address the ability of the
increasingly autonomous motor vehicle to make correct
decisions and perform reliably when assuming a substantial
number of driving responsibilities is to utilize multiple tests
that make use of the agency’s ability to use ranges of values,
representative test conditions, and test devices.
As
previously discussed, the Safety Act requires standards to be
stated in objective terms and case law indicates that this
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means a standard which is capable of producing identical
results when the test conditions are exactly duplicated and is
based upon readings obtained by measuring instruments.120
In accomplishing these goals and the goals of addressing the
safety need while ensuring practicability of the standard,
NHTSA has often utilized ranges, selected representative test
conditions, or utilized specific test devices.
NHTSA often utilizes a range of possible test values in
order to ensure that a standard is not only stated objectively,
but also practicable and addresses the safety need. In such
situations, the agency has indicated in the Code of Federal
Regulations (CFR) that these are the set of possible values or
conditions that the agency may test at and that the
manufacturer must certify that its vehicle will meet the
requirements in the standard when tested to any of those test
conditions within the specified range.121 For example, in
FMVSS No. 208, entitled “Occupant Crash Protection,”
vehicles are crashed into a barrier at any speed up to 35
mph.122 The agency specified a range of speed conditions to
help to ensure that protection is provided for a wide range of
crash severity levels.
Similarly, a range of test conditions could be utilized in
order to ensure that the autonomous motor vehicle can
handle multiple conditions. For example, if NHTSA was to
test an autonomous motor vehicle’s ability to accurately avoid
pedestrians at an intersection, the agency could define a test
intersection (e.g., four way intersection controlled by traffic
light) and present the vehicle with various test objects
defined so as to replicate the appearance of a pedestrian to
the vehicle’s sensors. In such a test, ranges of values could be
utilized to make the test more representative of the possibly
erratic trajectory of a pedestrian. For example, the standard
could establish that the pedestrian test object could begin at
any point within a defined area in the intersection and
proceed at any vector at any speed up to 10 mph. Such a

120. Chrysler Corp. v. Dept. of Transp., 472 F.2d 659, 675 (6th Cir. 1972).
121. See Explanation of Usage 49 C.F.R. § 571.4 (2011) (explaining that the
use of the word “any,” in connection with a range of values or set of items means
that any one of those values within the specified range may be selected for
testing).
122. 49 C.F.R. § 571.208, para. S5.1.1(b)(2) (2011).
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range of conditions would help to ensure that the vehicle
would adequately detect and avoid any potential pedestrians
within a defined range of possibilities.
In addition, the agency utilizes representative test
conditions in order to ensure that the test is not only
rationally linked to the safety need, but also objective and
repeatable. In these instances, the test does not attempt to
evaluate the vehicle’s performance under all possible
conditions that might occur in the real world. Instead, these
tests establish conditions such that it is rational to conclude
that if vehicles are able to meet the requirements of the
standard when subjected to the test procedures and
conditions specified in the standard, the vehicles will perform
well in the vast majority of real world conditions they can be
expected to encounter. One example of the agency’s utilizing
this method is in FMVSS No. 220, “School Bus Rollover
Protection.” In this standard, the agency’s test specifies using
a flat plate to apply a uniformly distributed force to the school
bus roof.123 This direct and top-down roof crush test condition
arguably does not correspond exactly to the actual conditions
that a school bus will be exposed to when it is involved in a
rollover crash because most rollovers do not involve the
application of a force directly perpendicular to the vehicle
chassis. However, as the excellent safety record of school
buses demonstrates, the representative test condition used in
FMVSS No. 220 does enable school buses to withstand
rollover crash forces better in the real world.124
Similarly, a representative test condition (or set of
representative test conditions) could be utilized to assess an
autonomous vehicle’s performance under the vast majority of
likely crash scenarios.
Using the forward collision
warning/collision imminent braking example from earlier in
this section, the agency could utilize a set of representative
conditions (such as matching the speed of a lead vehicle
traveling at 40 mph, a stopped lead vehicle, and a rapidly
decelerating lead vehicle) in order to ensure that the test
123. See 49 C.F.R. § 571.220 para. S5.
124. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Denial of Petition for
Rulemaking; School Buses, 76 Fed. Reg. 53102, 53104 (Aug. 25, 2011)
(discussing that school bus passengers are generally less likely to be fatally
injured in a crash).

WOOD

2012]

11/14/2012 12:53 AM

POTENTIAL CHALLENGES OF AMVS

1463

vehicle can adequately respond in the various possible real
world forward collision scenarios. Although NHTSA might be
unable to test the vehicle’s forward collision avoidance
capabilities under all possible forward collision scenarios,
NHTSA might be able to establish a set of test conditions
such that it would be rational to conclude that because a
vehicle can adequately handle the defined test conditions, it
should be able to handle the vast majority of likely real world
conditions.
Using the same logic, NHTSA might be able to ensure
adequate minimum electronic systems performance of
autonomous motor vehicles by establishing various tests
designed to ensure the minimum performance of
representative safety features. As mentioned earlier in this
Article, an autonomous motor vehicle is a vehicle which
integrates the functionality of many different autonomous
driving technologies. For example, an autonomous motor
vehicle would likely need to incorporate the functions of a
forward collision warning/collision imminent braking system
and the pedestrian avoidance system described above. While
the agency might be unable to practicably test a given
autonomous motor vehicle model’s ability to appropriately
react to the full gamut of possible crash scenarios, the agency
would likely still be able to ensure that—whatever
autonomous driving system is used by the manufacturer—the
vehicle is able to appropriately react to a defined set of crash
scenarios (such as pedestrian avoidance and forward collision
avoidance).
NHTSA would also be able to test the performance of
software and electronic control systems by requiring the use
of a specific test device in the agency’s compliance test.
NHTSA often utilizes test devices in order to determine
compliance with FMVSSs. For example, FMVSS No. 208,
“Occupant
Crash
Protection,”
utilizes
specified
anthropomorphic test dummies in evaluating compliance with
the agency’s airbag and crashworthiness requirements.125
The CFR contains a detailed description of the test dummies
and other similar devices that are used to measure the
amount of crash force that would be exposed to a person in a
125. See, e.g., 49 C.F.R. §. 571.208, paras. S5.1.1(b), S6, S14.5.
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crash.126 Further, FMVSS No. 208 contains specific injury
criteria which establish the permissible amount of crash force
that can be exposed to the test dummy’s head, neck, chest,
etc.127 Using the test procedure defining the crash conditions
in conjunction with the aforementioned test dummies, the
agency can establish an objective minimum performance
requirement on the necessary level of protection for a vehicle
occupant during a crash.
In a similar fashion, test devices can be utilized for
ensuring a minimum level of software and electronic systems
performance. As we noted in earlier sections of this Article,
NHTSA’s authority extends to motor vehicle equipment,
regardless of whether it is a physical/mechanical item, or an
intangible piece of software. Similarly, test devices in the
future might include software programs designed to expose
the faults in logic or coding of software used in vehicles.
When NHTSA enlisted NASA’s assistance in investigating
possible software or electronic issues that might lead to
unintended acceleration in a vehicle, NASA utilized various
source code analysis software designed to detect coding errors
and logic model checking.128 In a similar fashion, one can
imagine a standard in which a specific diagnostic (simulation)
software (or set of diagnostic software) capable of producing
objective results is specified in the regulatory text for use in
evaluating the quality of the source code or logic processing of
a software component of a motor vehicle. While the analysis
conducted by NASA for the unintended acceleration
investigation was very extensive, a simplified and less
extensive version might be possible as part of a standard for
electronic systems. Using a software diagnostic tool is
analogous to NHTSA’s current practice of using physical test
devices such as anthropomorphic test dummies to determine
compliance with a safety standard.
126. See Anthropomorphic Test Devices, 49 C.F.R. pt. 572 (describing in
detail the various test devices that are used by the agency).
127. See 49 C.F.R. § 571.208, para. S6.
128. See NASA ENG’G & SAFETY CTR., TI-10-00618, TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT
REPORT: NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN. TOYOTA UNINTENDED
ACCELERATION
INVESTIGATION
APPENDIX
A,
available
at
http://www.nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/nvs/pdf/NASA_FR_Appendix_A_Software.pdf
(stating that NASA used Coverity, CodeSonar, and Uno to check for coding
errors and Spin and Swarm to check the logic model).
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As using diagnostic software only tests the coding and
logic of the vehicle’s software component, it does not enable a
regulatory agency to test many other aspects of the
performance that would be critical in autonomous driving
systems. While using diagnostic software would enable
NHTSA to determine if the software will make the correct
decisions given a certain set of input data, additional testing
would be required to ensure that a vehicle’s sensors are
providing accurate information about the surrounding
environment so that the vehicle can effectively execute the
software’s commands. Thus, utilizing diagnostic software
tests in conjunction with other tests utilizing ranges of values
and representative tests conditions (as described above)
might afford more comprehensive protection. Defining a set
of tests as described above can enable the agency to ensure
objective and practicable standards. By utilizing the ability
to define ranges of values, sets of representative test
conditions, and test devices, the agency should be able to
ensure a minimum level of electronic systems performance in
a sufficient number of crash scenarios so as to rationally
conclude that the tested vehicles will be able to appropriately
react to the majority of likely crash scenarios.
C. Vehicle Computer System Security and Privacy—Their
Impact on Safety Effectiveness and/or Public Acceptance
The increased prevalence of electronic components in
vehicles leads to unique challenges regarding the security of
vehicle systems. Not only are electronic systems being
developed that can assist (or replace) the driver’s senses and
decision-making functions, electronic systems are already
being used to replace traditionally mechanical components of
the vehicle.129
This increased permeation of electronic
components into the motor vehicle could expose the vehicle to
new safety issues if persons can gain access to these
electronic components and can manipulate how these
components issue commands or otherwise interact with the
vehicle. Through the increased use of wireless connections
(whether as a medium for V2V safety communications or for
other, non-safety related purposes), it is well demonstrated
129. See, e.g., Drive-by-Wire™ Throttle System, supra note 53.
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that it is possible to obtain unauthorized access to a vehicle’s
As
systems without physical access to the vehicle.130
autonomous driving systems assume more and more driving
tasks, there is an increasing potential for a person with
unauthorized access to create significant safety issues.
Further, these risks are aggravated by the increasingly
connected nature of these vehicles because increased
connectivity (especially wireless) exposes vehicles to more
sources of potential bad actors.
If electronic and autonomous vehicle control systems are
vulnerable to unauthorized access, the safety effectiveness of
autonomous vehicle systems would suffer. This loss of
effectiveness would reduce public confidence in and use of
those systems, leading to still further loss of safety benefits.
We have noted in this Article that public acceptance is an
important aspect to be considered when evaluating the
practicability (and effectiveness) of a safety standard.131
Making autonomous driving systems secure from
unauthorized intrusion and modification would be an
important element of a comprehensive effort to instill trust in
the public regarding those technologies. Further, seeking to

130. Researchers from USC and Rutgers were able to obtain unauthorized
access to a vehicle’s systems through the wireless tire pressure monitoring
systems. See Peter Bright, Cars Hacked Through Wireless Tire Sensors, ARS
TECHNICA (Aug. 10, 2010, 1:20 PM), http://arstechnica.com/security/news/
2010/08/cars-hacked-through-wireless-tyre-sensors.ars. This wireless intrusion
into the vehicle followed another demonstration in which researchers were able
to disable the brakes and the engine of a vehicle through physically accessing
the OBD-II diagnostic port. See Robert McMillan, Car Hackers Can Kill Brakes,
Engine, and More, PC WORLD (May 13, 2010, 11:20 PM),
http://www.pcworld.com/businesscenter/article/196293/car_hackers_can_kill_br
akes_engine_and_more.html).
131. See Pac. Legal Found. v. Dept. of Transp., 593 F.2d 1338, 1345–46 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 830 (1979). In addition to including cyber security
requirements in a standard to ensure that a particular standard is practicable,
NHTSA would also be able to issue cyber security standards on an independent
basis. See Clifton v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 114 F.3d 1309, 1312 (1st Cir. 1997).
This is consistent with the principle of administrative law that agencies are
authorized to promulgate rules reasonably related to achieving the purpose of
the statute granting the rulemaking authority. Id. Because standards aimed at
enhancing the security of electronic systems on motor vehicles would maintain
the level of effectiveness of the safety features controlled by those electronic
systems, NHTSA would be authorized able to promulgate such standards
because they would be reasonably related to promoting motor vehicle safety.
See id.
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ensure that the security of these autonomous driving systems
is protected only in ways that give due regard to the privacy
concerns of the general public would likewise be crucial to
securing public acceptance and ensuring the practicability of
any potential standard. For example, it is important that the
transmission of the “Here I am” message by motor vehicles in
a V2V environment be accomplished in ways that do not
reveal personal information.
1. Technical Issue: Sources and Modes of Attack Are
Unknown, Unpredictable, and Likely to Be EverChanging
One significant challenge in establishing standards to
address unauthorized access to electronic control systems in
vehicles is the rapid pace at which this area of technology
evolves and the many possible interfaces that can serve as
potential portals for intrusion. Unlike the products released
by the original equipment manufacturers that generally
adhere to a multi-year product cycle, the methods utilized by
potential bad actors are constantly evolving.
While
automakers might begin issuing software updates to their
vehicles instead of waiting for the next product cycle,132 such
updates are unlikely to be as unpredictable and numerous as
the possible changes in tactics used by unknown members of
the general public seeking to gain unauthorized access to
vehicle systems regardless of the security measures used. As
developing and publishing a rule can often take more than a
year133 and major revisions to FMVSSs can often contain
multi-year phase-in schedules,134 it can be extremely difficult
132. Ford has issued an update to its vehicles already on the market that
utilize the MyFordTouch system. See Sharon Silke Carty, Ford Tries to
Resuscitate Its Image with a Bunch of Thumb Drives, AOL AUTOS (Nov. 7,
2011), http://autos.aol.com/article/ford-tries-to-resuscitate-image/. Customers
are able to update their MyFordTouch system by either bringing the vehicle to a
Ford dealership or using a USB flash drive they receive from Ford in the mail.
Id.
133. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Improving the Environment of Agency
Rulemaking: An Essay on Management, Games, and Accountability, in YALE
LAW SCHOOL FACULTY SCHOLARSHIP SERIES 200 (1994), available at
http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2167&context=fs
s_papers (“roughly 1.5 person years per agency”).
134. See, e.g., Advanced Air Bag Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. 30,680, 30,718 (May
12, 2000).
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for regulatory agencies to properly identify the relevant
security risks of electronic in-vehicle systems and anticipate
the potential security breaches that can occur over the next
few years. Unlike the past, when vehicle systems were
largely mechanical and subject to the automakers’ multi-year
product cycle, establishing standards to address the security
concerns of electronic systems is far less predictable.
2. Legal and Practical Issues: Providing Protection from
Unauthorized Intrusions into Autonomous
Driving Systems
While the potential security risks with automotive
electronic systems are unpredictable, there might be certain
areas in which the agency’s authority to address security
issues135 could be used in ways that contribute toward
ensuring a minimum level of protection.
However,
coordinated action by NHTSA and other entities (such as
state governments) might provide the most comprehensive
protection. In their article discussing the security of vehicle
electronic systems, Dennis K. Nilsson and Ulf E. Larson opine
that the priority areas for action in the immediate future
should be ensuring that external sources of information for
the vehicle are authenticated and that interfaces that are
exposed to those external sources are properly guarded
against unwanted intrusions.136 However, as the authors
note, there are significant challenges to ensuring that vehicle
electronic system interfaces are guarded against unwanted
intrusions in automotive applications because many of these
applications (such as crash imminent safety applications)
have little time to spare for firewalls or other protective
measures.137

135. The agency’s authority to address security issues was recognized by
Congress’ inclusion in MAP-21 of a provision directing NHTSA to consider the
need for establishing safety standards to prevent unauthorized access to the
electronic systems in passenger motor vehicles. See Pub. L. No. 112-141, §
31402, 126 Stat. 405.
136. See DENNIS K. NILSSON & ULF E. LARSON, A ROADMAP FOR SECURING
VEHICLES AGAINST CYBER ATTACKS, available at http://varma.ece.cmu.edu/
Auto-CPS/Nilsson_Chalmers.pdf.
See also STEPHEN CHECKOWAY ET AL.
COMPREHENSIVE EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSES OF AUTOMOTIVE ATTACK SURFACES,
available at http://www.autosec.org/pubs/cars-usenixsec2011.pdf.
137. See id.
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Ensuring that external sources of information are
authenticated and trusted has been a major focus for the
Department in its connected vehicle research.138 The program
envisions a system which uses certificates to ensure that
sources of information entering into a vehicle are trusted
sources of information. It is not difficult to imagine a
standard that requires vehicles to accept only information
accompanied by authenticated security certificates in a
certain fashion or update them at specified intervals. As
mentioned earlier, NHTSA is required to establish
performance standards but can be quite specific in
establishing such standards in order to meet the need for
safety. In this instance, the nature of the safety need
(ensuring that each source of information for the vehicle’s
electronic systems is a trusted source) would necessitate quite
detailed management of certificates and that all vehicles are
able to communicate with the certificating entity or entities.
Finally, while NHTSA’s authority extends to the vehicle
equipment used to ensure security from unauthorized vehicle
access, NHTSA’s authority to prevent after-market
modifications to motor vehicles is limited.139 Specifically,
NHTSA has the authority to prevent manufacturers,
distributors, dealers and motor vehicle repair businesses from
making modifications to motor vehicles that would take the
motor vehicle out of compliance with an FMVSS (that the
vehicle was certified as compliant with at the time the vehicle
was manufactured).140 However, private owners of motor
138. See RESEARCH & INNOVATIVE TECH. ADMIN., CERTIFICATE
MANAGEMENT ENTITY SLIDE SHOW, available at http://www.its.dot.gov/
meetings/pdf/BAH_CME_Webinar.pdf. In the Department’s connected vehicle
program, vehicles are intended to communicate a safety message to each other
in order to enable various advanced safety functions. See Vehicle-to-Vehicle
(V2V) Communications for Safety, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP.: RESEARCH &
INNOVATIVE TECH. ADMIN., http://www.its.dot.gov/factsheets/v2v_factsheet.htm
(last visited June 3, 2012). Thus, one important issue being explored is how to
ensure that each vehicle transmitting safety information is a reliable source of
information. See id.
139. As mentioned above in Part II, the Safety Act expressly prohibits motor
vehicle repair businesses from “mak[ing] inoperative any part of a device or
element of design installed on or in a motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment
in compliance with an applicable [FMVSS] . . . .” 49 U.S.C. § 33012(b) (2006).
However, private owners of motor vehicles are not precluded from making these
after-market modifications under this provision of the Act. See id.
140. See id.
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vehicles are not bound under the provision of the Act which
allows NHTSA to preclude after-market modifications to
motor vehicles in violation of an established FMVSS.141 While
NHTSA may establish tamper-resistance requirements in
FMVSSs to discourage private owners from modifying or
disabling the safety features in their own vehicles, the agency
does not have direct authority to prohibit owners from taking
such actions.142 NHTSA also does not have the direct
authority to require vehicle owners to maintain safety
systems on their vehicles.
Thus, while NHTSA may preclude certain types of actors
from modifying or providing services to the public that modify
vehicle security systems (e.g., requiring a vehicle to accept
certificates to authenticate it as a trustworthy source of
information), state governments or other entities would have
the authority to take action to directly ensure that the vehicle
users on their roads have properly maintained their vehicles
so that they can participate in the security infrastructure.143
NHTSA could require that manufacturers ensure that new
autonomous vehicles are equipped with the latest system
security updates at the point of sale.
States could
complement the Federal action by requiring that drivers
continue to update their vehicle’s security software. Further,
the states could more directly ensure that vehicle owners do
not disable or tamper with an autonomous vehicle’s security
systems. NHTSA may be able to establish fairly specific
standards regarding a vehicle’s minimum level of cyber
security protection. However, addressing many of the other
aspects of cyber security performance may require other
entities to act in conjunction with NHTSA in order to provide
an appropriate minimum level of protection.

141. See id.
142. Contrast this provision with the parallel provision in the Clean Air Act,
42 U.S.C. § 7522(a)(3)(A) (2006). That provision prohibits “any person” from
removing or rendering inoperative any device or element of design installed on
or in a new or used motor vehicle or motor vehicle engine in compliance with
Federal regulations issued under the Clean Air Act. Id.
143. While NHTSA has established vehicle use standards, see, e.g., 49 C.F.R.
pt. 570 (2009), these standards do not (by themselves) establish requirements
upon any person. See 49 C.F.R. pt. 570.3. Instead, NHTSA works with the
states (through vehicle inspection programs) to apply these requirements. See
id.
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3. Privacy Issues: Data and Locational Privacy
As we discussed in previous sections of this Article, one
aspect of ensuring that a standard is practicable involves
ensuring that the public will accept and use the technologies
being installed to meet that standard.144
While the
vulnerability of autonomous driving systems to security
threats has the potential to affect public acceptance, steps to
reduce that vulnerability can also affect public acceptance.
This point can be illustrated by an example drawn from
efforts to address system vulnerabilities in implementing
vehicle-to-vehicle communications systems. One potential
measure for addressing security concerns entails each
vehicle’s being issued unique security certificates.
To
implement a system for certificating each transmitter of
information to a vehicle to ensure that the transmitter is a
trusted source might raise concerns regarding the impact of
certificating on the privacy of the participants in this
network. Specifically, the broadcasting of a unique security
certificate by each vehicle has raised concerns that the
system could be used to track individual drivers. These
concerns should be taken into account and addressed in
making decisions about whether and how to implement such
a system. Otherwise, such a system could reduce the public’s
acceptance of vehicles equipped to send and receive vehicleto-vehicle communications. Autonomous vehicles that do not
use vehicle-to-vehicle communications might nevertheless
also present privacy concerns.
To the extent that an
autonomous driving system relies on GPS to determine its
location its position on the road and relative to the map, this
reliance could cause concerns about the possibility of tracking
(as the existence of a device that generates location
information might enable the recordation of such
information).145
With this in mind, the Department’s connected vehicle
program has conducted research into the methods available
144. See Pac. Legal Found. v. Dept. of Transp., 593 F.2d 1338, 1345–46 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 830 (1979).
145. Brief for Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Association, Inc. as
Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 5–8, United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct.
945 (2012) (No. 10-1259) (protesting regulations requiring that certain trucks be
equipped with GPS devices).
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for ensuring both the security of connected vehicles and the
privacy of the individuals who use these systems. The
Department has examined the possibility of separating the
functions used to create these security certificates to ensure
anonymity of the users and the reliability of the
information.146
Finally, we note that privacy concerns for autonomous
driving systems (and public acceptance of these systems) are
not limited to system security functions. While we have
described in the preceding two paragraphs how addressing
potential risks in system security might lead to increased
concern regarding the protection of private information,
privacy concerns are not limited to efforts aimed at
addressing system security risks. Any FMVSS aimed at
requiring advanced crash avoidance technologies or
autonomous driving systems would involve the potential for
more sophisticated measuring (and potentially recording) of
safety relevant information regarding the driver’s behavior
(such as direction, speed, etc.). Thus, any such FMVSS would
need to reflect careful consideration of the potential
collections of information that might be required under the
FMVSS. Any such FMVSS should consider whether such
information needs to be collected and what safeguards would
be in place to protect this information once it is collected.
Through this analysis, an FMVSS might be more likely to be
practicable because the public might be more willing to accept
advanced technologies (such as autonomous driving
technologies) when the public is assured that their private
information will be protected.
D. Human Machine Interface
The human machine interface (HMI), for the purposes of
this Article, represents the process by which the vehicle and
driver interact and communicate with each other. The
interaction between the driver and the vehicle becomes
increasingly relevant with the adoption of advanced crash
avoidance technologies and autonomous driving technologies.
In the future, the driver will likely not only be exposed to an
increasing amount of messages/warnings from the vehicle,
146. See generally supra note 138.
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but also be sharing the driving task with the vehicle.
Because the human driver can only respond to a finite
amount of information, at some point additional information
collected by the vehicle will only be useful if it is used to
assist the driver with vehicle control. Further, because the
vehicle is unlikely to be able to handle all driving conditions
in the immediate future, the ability of the driver to quickly
and correctly interpret communications from the autonomous
vehicle is of paramount importance. Thus, timely, accurate,
clear, and non-distracting communications between the driver
and the vehicle is an issue of increasing importance with the
progressive incorporation of these technologies in motor
vehicles.
1. Technical Issue: Quickly and Smoothly Transferring
Control Between Driver and Vehicle
As the vehicle increasingly assists or takes over for the
human driver (particularly for the performance of safety
critical functions) ensuring safety will likely require that a
human be ready and able to step in and assume control of
vehicle direction and speed with little or even no advance
notice. This means that the driver should not only remain
ready to assume driving tasks, but also should understand
the interface that the vehicle uses to communicate with the
driver. The increased sharing of the driving responsibility
contributes significantly to the amount of information that
needs to be communicated between the vehicle and the driver
and the level of sophistication of that information. How can
the vehicle ensure that the driver is ready and able to take
over the driving task should the driver’s expertise be
required?
How will the driver receive the relevant
information regarding the potential safety hazards around
the vehicle? Will the driver experience information overload?
How should the messages be prioritized? How will the
vehicle communicate with the driver that he or she needs to
assume control? The ability of a vehicle to communicate this
information and to interact with the driver is critical in the
implementation of these technologies.
Even as vehicles increasingly warn, intervene and even
assume driving responsibility, there are still many scenarios
that will likely require the driver to assume control of the
vehicle in the foreseeable future. Given the current state of
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technology autonomous driving systems are generally not
capable of correctly assessing and handling all driving
scenarios—especially atypical ones, i.e., those that depart
from those ordinarily encountered in real-world road
conditions. For example, an autonomous motor vehicle might
be able to sense a stoplight color and make the correct
decision on whether to stop or go. However, difficulties might
arise when that vehicle encounters a traffic light that is not
functioning due to a power outage in the area or a traffic
officer giving hand signals at an intersection. Additionally,
heavy rain or snow could interfere with an autonomous motor
vehicle’s ability to determine correctly the status of a traffic
light. In addition, these systems, like any other systems,
presumably can be expected to malfunction on occasion. In
these situations, the vehicle must be able to recognize the
malfunction and then alert the driver that the autonomous
driving system is not functioning and that the driver must
again assume driving responsibility. The vehicle design and
the communications between the vehicle and the driver must
allow the driver to safely accomplish this transition from
vehicle to driver control.
2. Potential Solution: Standardizing the HMI to Ensure
Consistent Messages and Method of Operation
and Encourage Appropriate Driver Engagement
While additional research would be necessary to
determine the level of safety need and whether a
standardized HMI and other minimum performance
requirements would be able to address that need, NHTSA has
the authority to require these elements in vehicle equipment
in order to ensure that the driver can safely assume control of
the vehicle. Although NHTSA does not directly regulate
driver behavior, the agency could influence the extent of
driver involvement in the driving task using the agency’s
regulatory authority over vehicle performance.147
For

147. While NHTSA may not be able to regulate the driver, NHTSA may be
able to indirectly influence the behavior of the driver through requiring the use
of new technologies which detect whether drivers are paying attention to the
driving task. See, e.g., Howard, supra note 11. NHTSA also has numerous nonregulatory initiatives and programs that are intended to, and do, influence
driver behavior. One example of this is the agency’s Driver Distraction
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example, NHTSA would be able to issue performance
standards or mandate particular items of motor vehicle
equipment148 to ensure that vehicles are consistent in their
communications to the driver.
Further, NHTSA could
exercise this authority by requiring the vehicle to encourage a
certain level of driver involvement in the driving task.149
Standardization of communications between the vehicle
and the driver, and the manner in which the driver assumes
driving responsibility from the vehicle could also encourage a
reasonable level of driver involvement and afford a greater
likelihood of a smooth transition of the driving responsibility
from the autonomous driving system to the driver. Such
standardization could also help ensure that drivers will
understand the communications or warnings from the vehicle
regardless of which vehicle they are in.
One method to accomplish these goals is by requiring
that the HMI of autonomous driving systems possess specific
standardized elements (i.e., alerts, signals, telltales, switches)
that make it possible for any driver to understand the
information being presented by a given vehicle. While
standardizing this interaction between the driver and the
autonomous driving system might constrain vehicle design to
some degree, it is within the agency’s authority to issue
performance standards to require the standardization of the
process as well as any warning lamps or other warning
devices to the extent necessary to achieve a safety objective.150
In situations in which standardization of a particular
process or vehicle feature will lead to an increase in overall
safety (as it will decrease the likelihood that drivers might
not understand the communications from the vehicle) NHTSA
has the authority under the Safety Act to issue standards
Guidelines. See Visual-Manual NHTSA Driver Distraction Guidelines for InVehicle Electronic Devices, 77 Fed. Reg. 11,200 (Feb. 24, 2012), available at
https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2012/02/24/2012-4017/visual-manualnhtsa-driver-distraction-guidelines-for-in-vehicle-electronic-devices.
148. “NHTSA’s regulatory authority extends beyond the performance of
motor vehicles per se, to particular items of equipment.” Washington v. Dept. of
Transp., 84 F.3d 1222, 1225 (10th Cir. 1996) (citing examples).
149. See e.g., Howard, supra note 11.
150. See Chrysler Corp. v. Dept. of Transp., 515 F.2d 1053 (6th Cir. 1975)
(upholding as within NHTSA’s authority under the Safety Act the agency’s
rulemaking prescribing requirements that particular headlamps must comply
with specific measurements stated in inches).
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that (because of the specificity of the performance required)
might constrain design.151 Such a standard could enable
drivers to clearly understand autonomous driving systems
and the scenarios in which the system would require the
driver to take control of the vehicle. Should the safety need
arise, the agency might require additional research to
determine the most effective form of standardized warning
that can urge a driver to retake control of an autonomous
motor vehicle. However, this regulatory tool is available to
NHTSA and is one method that can be used to ensure that
the driver and autonomous driving system understand each
other.
E. Retrospective Review to Assess the Effect of New
Technologies on Benefits of Existing Standards
In addition to the aforementioned issues, NHTSA’s rules
are reviewed pursuant to the requirements of Executive
Orders 12866 (Regulatory Planning and Review)152 and 13563
Both
(Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review).153
Executive Orders instruct federal agencies to conduct cost
benefit analyses of proposed and final rules in order to help
ensure that agencies use the least burdensome methods to
achieve the regulatory end.154 Both also instruct the agencies
to revise their regulations as circumstances change. Section 5
of EO 12866 provides:
Sec. 5. In order to . . . determine whether regulations
promulgated by the executive branch of the Federal
Government have become unjustified or unnecessary as a
result of changed circumstances . . . , each agency shall
submit to OIRA a program, consistent with its resources
and regulatory priorities, under which the agency will
periodically review its existing significant regulations to
determine whether any such regulations should be
modified or eliminated so as to make the agency’s
regulatory program more effective in achieving the
regulatory objectives, less burdensome, or in greater
151. See id. (holding that standardization of a particular piece of equipment
on a vehicle is not inconsistent with the mandate in the Safety Act that safety
standards not dictate vehicle design).
152. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994).
153. Exec. Order No. 13,563, 3 C.F.R. 215 (2012).
154. See id.
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Section 6 of E.O. 13563 directs the federal agencies to conduct
a retrospective review of all existing rules periodically.155 The
purpose of this requirement is to ensure that existing rules
are analyzed to determine whether they are outmoded,
ineffective or excessively burdensome and whether or not
these rules should be modified or repealed.156
If, as anticipated, the advanced crash avoidance
technologies and autonomous driving systems significantly
reduce or mitigate a variety of types of crashes without
resulting in any significant unintended consequences, the
benefits associated with many current safety standards are
likely to decrease. Since the costs of compliance would be
generally unaffected, while the lives saved and injuries
reduced or avoided would decrease, the cost per equivalent
life saved by these standards would presumably increase.
Thus, in conducting reviews of its safety standards, NHTSA
would need to consider how the changes in the estimated
benefits of each standard affects the cost per equivalent life
saved and decide whether any of the standards should be
amended. For example, if autonomous driving systems were
capable of assuming the driving task and avoiding many of
the crashes at speeds higher than a certain speed (such as 20
or 30 mph), then as the percentage of vehicles equipped with
those systems increased, it would become increasingly
appropriate for the agency to consider whether there was a
need to amend the requirements of various crashworthiness
standards to reflect changing risks to occupant safety.157
Similarly, safety measures that might be appropriate
during the early and middle stages of the progression from
driver-controlled vehicles to fully automated vehicles appear
likely to cease to be needed once the end stage is reached. In
the former stages, when control is being transferred back and
155. See id. at 217.
156. See id.
157. Crashworthiness standards are standards that address the ability of a
vehicle to protect its occupants in a crash. See Crashworthiness, NHTSA.GOV,
http://www.nhtsa.gov/cars/rules/CrashWorthy/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2012);
Crashworthiness, NHTSA.GOV, http://www.nhtsa.gov/Research/Crashworth
iness (last visited Oct. 20, 2012). In contrast, crash avoidance standards are
intended to help avoid or at least mitigating crashes.
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forth between the driver and the vehicle as the vehicle passes
through different driving environments, the ability of the
driver and the vehicle to anticipate and seamlessly handle the
transfers of control will be of great safety importance.
Human factors considerations regarding such matters as
advance warning of impending transfers of control to the
driver, situational awareness, compensating behaviors, and
effects of increasing automation on driver skills might
necessitate NHTSA’s adopting appropriate regulatory and
non-regulatory measures. However, once the progression is
completed, the significance of the human factor
considerations will decline substantially because control will
remain with the vehicle throughout each trip. The need for
any regulatory measures adopted to address human factors
issues in the early and middle stages will theoretically have
substantially disappeared by the time of the final stage. At
that point, the two orders would require the agency to assess
whether those regulatory measures should be modified or
repealed and take appropriate action based on the results of
that assessment.
V. RECALL AND REMEDY OF MOTOR VEHICLES AND
EQUIPMENT WITH SAFETY DEFECTS
Under the Safety Act, a manufacturer’s obligation to
recall motor vehicles and motor vehicle equipment
determined by the manufacturer or NHTSA to have a safetyrelated defect158 is separate and distinct from its obligation to
recall motor vehicles and motor vehicle equipment
determined by the manufacturer or NHTSA to fail to comply
with an applicable safety standard that is in effect at the time
of manufacture.159 The obligation to recall, which includes

158. 49 U.S.C. § 30118 (2006) (directing the Secretary to require the
notification, recall and remedy of any motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment
he or she determines to contain a safety defect or to fail to comply with a safety
standard and requiring a manufacturer to notify consumers of any motor
vehicle or motor vehicle equipment the Secretary determines to contain a safety
defect or to fail to comply with a safety standard). Id. § 30120 (requiring
manufacturers of vehicles and motor vehicle equipment to recall and remedy a
safety defect or noncompliance with a safety standard free of charge).
159. See § 30120; United States v. Chrysler Corp., 158 F.3d 1350, 1351 (D.C.
Cir. 1998) (NHTSA “may seek the recall of a motor vehicle either when a vehicle
has ‘a defect related to motor vehicle safety’ or when a vehicle ‘does not comply
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the provision of a remedy without charge, defective motor
vehicles and motor vehicle equipment is not dependent upon
the agency’s prior issuance of a standard addressing the type
of performance in which a defect has been found.
Thus, notwithstanding the absence of a safety standard
for a particular advanced crash avoidance technology or
autonomous driving system, the agency could respond to a
safety problem posed by a vehicle with one of those
technologies or systems by ordering a recall if it could show
that there is a defect and that the defect poses an
unreasonable risk to motor vehicle safety.160 Determining
whether one of the technologies or systems is defective would
present many of the same challenges that the agency would
face in developing and issuing safety standards for these
technologies and systems.
A. Definition of Defect
A defect “includes any defect in performance,
construction, a component, or material of a motor vehicle or
motor vehicle equipment.”161 It also includes a defect in
design.162 NHTSA can establish the existence of a defect in
vehicles or equipment in a variety of ways.
NHTSA
frequently focuses its investigations on defects in
performance. It can identify a broken part of a vehicle or

with an applicable motor vehicle safety standard.’ ”).
160. See § 30120.
161. § 30102(a)(2).
162. In United States v. Gen. Motors Corp. (Wheels), 518 F.2d 420, 432 (D.C.
Cir. 1975), the court recognized the linkages between the term defect and motor
vehicle safety, and the defect and the remedy. Both the motor vehicle safety
definition and the remedy provision refer to design defects. The term “motor
vehicle safety” refers to unreasonable risk of accidents occurring because of the
“design, construction, or performance” of a motor vehicle. Wheels, 518 F.2d at
432. In view of the linkage, design defects are actionable. Indeed, the Wheels
court recognized this in its discussion of the 1974 amendments to the Safety
Act:
The remedy without charge requirement is intended to require
manufacturers to correct at their expense defects in the performance,
design, or construction of their products which relate to motor vehicle
safety. It is not intended that manufacturers be required to make
corrections if they can establish that the condition requiring correction
results from the abuse of their products or the failure to adequately
maintain them.
Id. at 436.
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present evidence of a number of occurrences that are
indicative of problematic performance to establish a defect.
For example, vehicles or items of equipment have incidences
of failure of performance and that the failure could not have
been caused by ordinary wear and tear.163
In addition to showing the existence of a defect, to compel
a recall NHTSA must also show that the defect is related to
motor vehicle safety. As defined in the Safety Act, motor
vehicle safety means “the performance of a motor vehicle or
motor vehicle equipment in a way that protects the public
against unreasonable risk of accidents occurring because of
the design, construction, or performance of a motor vehicle,
and against unreasonable risk of death or injury in an
accident, and includes nonoperational safety of a motor
vehicle.”164 This definition encompasses crash avoidance,
crashworthiness and nonoperational safety. The concept of
an unreasonable risk to motor vehicle safety is broad.165 For
example, a defect poses an “unreasonable risk to motor
vehicle safety” if the defect results in a fire that creates a
potentially hazardous situation to the driver and can be
reasonably expected to occur again in the future.166 Defects
that cause a driver to lose control of a motor vehicle even at
low speeds can pose an unreasonable risk to motor
163. Wheels, 518 F.2d at 432 (holding that NHTSA is not required to prove
that the vehicle performance failures occurred during normal use, the agency
may establish a prima facie case of defect by showing a significant number of
failures). After NHTSA has established a defect, the manufacturer may
attempt to establish, “as an affirmative defense, that the failures were
attributable to gross and unforeseeable owner abuse or unforeseeable neglect of
vehicle maintenance.” Id.
164. 49 U.S.C. § 30102(a)(8).
165. See United States v. Gen. Motors Corp. (Pitman Arms), 561 F.2d 923,
928–29 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (stating that in addition to proving the presence of a
defect in the vehicle, NHTSA must show that the defect is related to motor
vehicle safety to initiate a recall). Motor vehicle safety is defined “as the
performance of a motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment in a way that
protects the public against unreasonable risk of accidents occurring because of
the design, construction, or performance of a motor vehicle.” § 30102(a)(8).
166. United States v. Gen. Motors Corp. (Carburetors), 565 F.2d 754, 758
(D.C. Cir. 1977) (finding that a defect that caused gasoline to leak out of the
carburetor onto the engine block creating a fire in the engine compartment
posed an “unreasonable risk to motor vehicle safety”); see also Pitman Arms,
561 F.2d at 929 (holding that a failure of the vehicle’s steering system that
caused the driver to lose control of the vehicle was an “unreasonable risk to
motor vehicle safety).
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vehicle safety. 167
Take the following hypothetical example. A vehicle
equipped with an advanced crash avoidance technology is
experiencing a considerable rate of forward collisions.
NHTSA would need to prove that the vehicle with that
system was defective and that the defect posed an
unreasonable risk to motor vehicle safety in order to require
the manufacturer to initiate a recall and remedy the vehicle
in question.
B. Establishing a Defect
Even when attempting to show a defect in a complex
electronic system, the agency can point to failures in
performance of a vehicle to establish the defect.168 The agency
does not need to identify a specific programming, engineering
or mechanical error to show a defect in a complex autonomous
or advance crash avoidance system such as the forward
collision avoidance system in the hypothetical discussed
above.169 In the event that an algorithm controlling a safetycritical-vehicle system failed to make the correct
determination in circumstances that likely would occur in the
real world, the agency would be able to point to that failure as
a way of establishing the existence of a defect.170 The agency
would not need to establish the defect by pointing to a specific
error in the algorithm flowchart or coding. As an easy
example, if the agency could point to some nontrivial
performance failure in a crash imminent braking system–
such as the system’s engaging the throttle, instead of the
brake, when the vehicle detected that a crash was imminent–
to establish that the system was defective, the agency would
not need to offer an engineering explanation for the defect.171
167. Pitman Arms, 561 F.2d at 929.
168. Id. Viewed another way, the agency does not need to prove causation in
the tort sense.
169. United States v. Gen. Motors Corp. (X-Cars), 841 F.2d 400, 413 (D.C.
Cir. 1988).
170. United States v. Gen. Motors Corp. (Wheels), 518 F.2d 420, 432 (D.C.
Cir. 1975).
171. In September 2011, Kia recalled Sorento models from 2007 and 2008
because the vehicles’ occupant classification system was misclassifying adult
passengers and deactivating the passenger side airbags. Jonathan Welch,
Recall Roundup: Kia, Subaru Report Airbag and Moonroof Flaws, WALL ST. J.
BLOG
(Sept.
16,
2011,
9:00
AM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/drivers-
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The agency would then be able to issue a recall order
assuming as is likely it could also establish that the defect
posed an unreasonable risk to motor vehicle safety.
1. Identifying Defects from Performance Failures
In the case of defects with electronic control systems,
being able to point to a failure in performance in lieu of a
specific error in the software coding is important when the
agency is attempting to show that these systems are
defective. Investigating electronic control systems in an
attempt to uncover specific errors in software coding that
could be causing a certain performance failure is very timeconsuming and expensive.
In response to reports of unintended acceleration in
Toyota vehicles equipped with electronic throttle controls,
NHTSA arranged to employ the expertise of the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to conduct a
study of the software that controlled the system to determine
if the software contained any errors that could have caused
the accelerator control system to malfunction.172 NHTSA
provided NASA with vehicles purchased from consumers who
had filed complaints of unintended acceleration with the
agency.173 The resulting NASA study lasted ten months and
cost $1.5 million.174 During the course of the study, amongst

seat/2011/09/16/recall-roundup-kia-subaru-report-airbag-and-moonroof-flaws/.
See also NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., OFFICE OF DEFECT
INVESTIGATION RESUME (EA-017) (2011), available at http://wwwodi.nhtsa.dot.gov/acms/cs/jaxrs/download/doc/UCM404705/INCLA-EA090171909.PDF (summarizing NHTSA’s investigation of the Sorento’s occupant
classification system). This is an example of a defect in an electronic control
system that provided evidence of the failure in performance. See id. When the
occupant classification system misclassified an occupant, a warning light would
go on indicating that the passenger side air bag was deactivated showing that
the system was not functioning as intended. Id.
172. See generally NASA ENG’G & SAFETY CTR., NHTSA TOYOTA
UNINTENDED
ACCELERATION
INVESTIGATION
(2011),
available
at
http://www.nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/nvs/pdf/NASA-UA_report.pdf
(examining
whether any design deficiencies in the Toyota Electronic Throttle Control
System Intelligent could cause unintended acceleration).
173. See id. at 19 (describing NASA’s methodology used in studying reports
of unintended acceleration in Toyota vehicles).
174. See Peter Whoriskey, Report Clears Toyota Electronics, WASH. POST.
Feb. 9, 2011, at A1 (reporting NASA’s efforts in investigating the link between
electronic throttle control systems and unintended acceleration).
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many other activities, NASA examined 280,000 lines of
software code and subjected the test vehicles to magnetic
radiation in an attempt to develop an explanation for the
NASA
reported incidents of unintended acceleration.175
conducted a fault tree analysis in order to eliminate possible
explanations of unintended acceleration.176 NASA also used
logic models to investigate whether the software that
controlled the electronic throttle controls contained errors
that could lead to unintended acceleration.177
If NHTSA needed to provide an engineering explanation
for every defect in advanced crash avoidance technologies or
autonomous driving systems, its defect investigations might
consume the same amount of time and resources used during
the agency’s investigation of unintended acceleration. This
would significantly limit the agency’s ability to induce or
require manufacturers to recall vehicles with defective
systems. That would, in turn, hinder the agency’s efforts to
ensure the continuing safety of motor vehicles.178
2. Challenges of Showing Defects from Performance
Failures Alone
Now assume that the failure in performance of the
advanced crash avoidance technology discussed in the
hypothetical above were not something so obvious as the
system’s engaging the throttle when it should be engaging the
brake. In order to determine if a vehicle were defective,
NHTSA would ordinarily first identify performance failures
in specific vehicles or components. NHTSA often looks to the
agency’s consumer complaints database and Early Warning
Reporting database to identify patterns of performance

175. Id.
176. See NASA ENG’G & SAFETY CTR., supra note 172, at 72 (describing the
system level failures in the throttle control system that would need to occur in
order for a vehicle to experience unintended acceleration).
177. A logic model explores all the possible responses of a system given a set
of inputs in an attempt to elicit responses that lead to software errors. See
NASA ENG’G & SAFETY CTR., supra note 128, at 10.
178. See United States v. Gen. Motors Corp. (Wheels), 518 F.2d 420, 438
(D.C. Cir. 1975) (stating that requiring NHTSA to show that every performance
failure was not attributable to owner abuse could have the effect of
undermining the importance that Congress placed on the agency’s ability to
order recalls of defective vehicles).
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failures involving a particular vehicle, vehicle component or
system that could be attributed to a defect.179
Once the agency has identified a series of performance
failures in vehicles with an advanced crash avoidance
technology or autonomous driving system, it might be
challenging for the agency to show that these failures were a
product of a defect (and refute a manufacturer’s contention of
driver error or some other external factor).180 While the
agency does not need to provide an engineering explanation
in order to show a defect, it can be difficult to show the
underlying performance failure relying on consumer
complaints alone.181 Because there are many factors that
influence forward collisions (the failure and performance that
would point to a defect in a crash imminent braking system),
it is unclear whether in various circumstances the differences
in crash rates or consumer complaints would be a sufficient
means for establishing the failure in performance present in
the hypothetical failure of the advanced crash avoidance
technology.
Some of the target crash scenarios that advanced crash
avoidance technologies are designed to mitigate include head179. See, e.g., United States v. Gen. Motors Corp. (X-Cars), 841 F.2d 400, 407
(D.C. Cir. 1988) (explaining that NHTSA based its claim of a performance defect
in the X-car’s brake system on the volume of consumer complaints that the
agency received regarding premature rear wheel lock-up); Reporting of Early
Warning Information, 72 Fed. Reg. 29,435 (May 29, 2007) (to be codified at 49
C.F.R. pt. 579) (stating that historically NHTSA identified defects primarily by
analyzing consumer complaints). The Transportation Recall Enhancement,
Accountability, and Documentation (TREAD) Act, Pub. L. No. 106-414, required
NHTSA to issue rules to establish an early warning reporting system to assist
the agency in identifying defects in a more expedited manner. Transportation
Recall Enhancement, Accountability, and Documentation (TREAD) Act, Pub. L.
No. 106-414 (2000) (current version at 49 U.S.C. §§ 30101–30170 (2006)).
NHTSA requires manufacturers of vehicles and equipment to notify the agency
of notices to dealers and consumers concerning defective equipment, foreign
recalls initiated by the manufacturer, incidences involving the death, injury,
and property damage, consumer complaints, and warranty claims attributable
to a specific vehicle component. 49 C.F.R. pt. 579 (2010).
180. See Ctr. for Auto Safety, Inc. v. Lewis, 685 F.2d 656, 663 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(citing the difficulties that the Department of Transportation would have faced
in proving a defect because the interaction between the driver and the vehicle
was a critical factor in the complained performance failure).
181. See X-Cars, 841 F.2d at 413 (stating that when NHTSA attempts to
show a defect through circumstantial evidence, the trial court can take into
account the absence of an engineering explanation in determining whether the
vehicle is defective).
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on collisions with vehicles travelling in the opposite direction,
rear-end collisions with a vehicle that is stopped, decelerating
or travelling at a lower speed, collisions with vehicles making
a left turn, collisions with vehicles going straight through a
vertical junction and collisions with vehicles executing other
turning maneuvers.182 Because crashes can be attributed to a
variety of factors or driver error of the second vehicle involved
in the crash a higher crash rate of a particular vehicle model
alone might not indicate a failure in performance amounting
to a defect.183
In situations in which the agency is attempting to show a
defect in performance that arguably can be attributable to
external factors, manufacturers would likely question the
complaints, arguing that consumers would have difficulty
determining whether the failure should be attributed to the
vehicle.184 This seems especially likely when the performance
failure complained of involves a complex system and the
agency cannot point to physical or engineering evidence of
failure.185
On the other hand, if a number of drivers
explained that a vehicle went haywire, and these problems
could not fairly be attributed to the driver or another vehicle,
the agency would not face a particularly difficult burden.
In the case of the hypothetical failure of the advanced
crash avoidance technology discussed above that was causing
an increased number of forward collisions, the manufacturer
of the vehicle might argue that vehicle speed dictated by the
182. See ANA MARIA EIGEN & WASSIM G. NAJM, DETAILED ANALYSIS OF
TARGET CRASHES FOR PRE-CRASH SENSING APPLICATIONS (2009), available at
http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/pdf/esv/esv21/09-0248.pdf (identifying crashes
from the National Automotive Sampling System’s Crashworthiness Data
System that could be mitigated using forward crash avoidance technologies).
183. The World Health Organization identifies excessive speed (either
exceeding the speed limit or driving too fast for conditions), driver impairment
or distraction, environmental factors (visibility and road conditions), vehicle
condition and road design as the leading causes of motor vehicle crashes.
WORLD HEALTH ORG., WORLD REPORT ON ROAD TRAFFIC INJURY PREVENTION
76–88
(Margie
Peden
et
al.
eds.,
2004),
available
at
http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2004/9241562609.pdf.
184. See X-Cars, 841 F.2d at 412–13 (in the context of brake lock up,
questioning whether consumers could determine with any degree of accuracy
what caused the performance failure complained of in that case).
185. See id. at 412 (stating that, in order to demonstrate that a defect exists,
NHTSA must show that performance failure complained of is attributable to the
vehicle instead of the driver or road conditions).
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driver, driver error, road conditions, or behavior of other
vehicles could have prevented the advanced crash avoidance
technology from functioning as intended. In fact, because
many of the crashes that a crash imminent braking system is
intended to avoid involve a second vehicle, it is likely that
there would be disputed reconstructions of crashes and
conflicting views on what went wrong.186
Because of the number of complex factors that could lead
to a forward collision, it might be difficult for the driver to
explain the circumstances and interactions that gave rise to a
crash and for experts to determine whether the crash should
be attributable to a failure in the vehicle’s advanced crash
avoidance technologies or some other factor that prevented
the vehicle’s systems from avoiding the crash.187 While
advanced crash avoidance technologies and autonomous
driving systems are designed to correct for some of the driver
related factors that contribute to crashes, for multiple vehicle
crashes driver error could be present in the second vehicle
and speed and environmental factors could still be crash
contributors.188 In view of the number of variables, it could be
challenging for NHTSA to identify the defect and require the
manufacturer to initiate a recall.189
3. Identifying the Cause of the Performance Failure:
Methods and Tools
NHTSA’s traditional method of identifying defects might
benefit from additional information to help uncover
performance failures in advanced crash avoidance
technologies and autonomous driving systems. While some
failures in the performance of algorithms that control these
186. See EIGEN & NAJM, supra note 182.
187. See WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 183.
188. See Tyler Cowen, Can I See Your, License, Registration and C.P.U.?,
(May
28,
2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/29/
NYTIMES.COM
business/economy/29view.html (discussing the potential safety benefits of
advanced crash avoidance and autonomous technologies); see also Interview
with Larry Page, Co-Founder, Google, & Eric Schmidt, CEO, Google, Question
and Answer at Zeitgeist Americas 2011 (Sept. 27, 2011), available at
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=srI6QYfi-HY (highlighting the capabilities of
the Google autonomous car). In the interview, Larry Page and Eric Schmidt
state that the Google autonomous car has better minimum capabilities than
most human drivers. Id.
189. Ctr. for Auto Safety, Inc. v. Lewis, 685 F.2d 656, 663 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
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systems might be evident (and thus manifest themselves in
consumer complaints or Early Warning Reporting databases),
other performance failures that vehicles experience might be
more difficult to identify. The likelihood of multiple failures
in performance increases as the information provided by the
vehicle’s sensors are linked to an ever-expanding number of
vehicle functions controlled by the vehicle’s onboard
computers. If shortcomings in design impact several aspects
of vehicle performance such as braking, acceleration, and
steering, it might be more difficult for the agency to identify a
pattern of performance failures by examining consumer
complaints or the Early Warning Reporting database, making
it difficult for the agency to isolate the defect.190
In order for the agency to identify defects and order
recalls of defective vehicles in a timely manner, the agency’s
traditional strategy might benefit from additional tools for
identifying failures in performance of advanced crash
avoidance technologies and autonomous driving systems that
pose an unreasonable risk to motor vehicle safety. One way
in which NHTSA would be able to determine if these systems
were functioning correctly at the time of a crash would be for
the system to record the vehicle functions and actions taken
by the computer control system prior to the crash. NHTSA
currently relies on event data recorders (EDRs) that collect
information about vehicle speed, throttle position, seatbelt
status and airbag deployment in investigating defects.191 The
190. See TRANSP. RESEARCH BD., supra note 116, at 78 (stating that if the
failure in performance caused by a defect cannot be traced to the failure of a
clearly identifiable component, the Early Warning Reporting database may not
be helpful in alert NHTSA to the existence of the defect).
191. NHTSA has issued requirements to standardize the information
collected by EDRs. 49 C.F.R. pt. 563 (2010). The agency does not currently
mandate that vehicles weighing 5500 pounds and less be equipped with an
EDR. Id. at pt. 563.3. Manufacturers currently install EDRs on light vehicles
on a voluntary basis. One of the recommendations contained in the National
Academy of Science report on electronic vehicle control systems was to ensure
that all new motor vehicles contain EDRs. TRANSP. RESEARCH BD., supra note
116, at 7. The report states that EDRs will help NHTSA detect electronic
failures and intermittent electronic faults that leave no physical evidence of a
defect. Id. According to NHTSA’s research and rulemaking priority plan, the
agency plans on issuing a proposal to require all new motor vehicles weighing
5500 pounds and less be equipped with an EDR. NHTSA VEHICLE SAFETY AND
FUEL ECONOMY RULEMAKING AND RESEARCH PRIORITY PLAN 20 (2011),
available at http://www.nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/rulemaking/pdf/2011-2013_Vehicle
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agency uses the information from EDRs to determine the
factors that contribute to crashes and to monitor the
performance of safety systems.192 The role of EDRs can be
potentially expanded in the future in order to provide
superior information regarding the potential causes of
performance failures. Both NHTSA and the manufacturers
would be able to use the data collected about the behavior of
these autonomous driving systems to improve the algorithms
that control these systems and enhance the systems’ response
to avoid collisions caused by driver error.193 However, as
discussed above, the agency would need to consider the
privacy implications of any such expansion and to examine
what steps could be taken to protect privacy.
4. Application of NHTSA’s Defect Authority to
Aftermarket Equipment
As noted above, NHTSA’s authority to investigate defects
applies to manufacturers of motor vehicle equipment194 (as
well as motor vehicles).195 NHTSA applies the same test to
determine whether a defect is present in an item of motor
vehicle equipment as it does when investigating defects in
motor vehicles.196 The Safety Act generally gives NHTSA the
ability to order recalls of autonomous driving technologies
_Safety-Fuel_Economy_Rulemaking-Research_Priority_Plan.pdf.
192. Event Data Recorders, 71 Fed. Reg. 50998 (Aug. 28, 2006) (to be codified
at 49 C.F.R. pt. 563).
193. See James K. Kuchar & Ann C. Drumm, The Traffic Alert and Collision
Avoidance System, 16 LINCOLN LAB. J. 277, 283–88 (2007) (studying strategies
that could enhance the performance of aircraft collision avoidance systems to
avoid collisions in situations in which the pilot of one aircraft ignores the
direction provided by the collision avoidance system).
194. Reading the terms “motor vehicle” and “replacement equipment”
together, NHTSA’s defects authority generally extends to the items that are
considered “motor vehicle equipment.” See supra note 158.
195. 49 U.S.C. § 30118 (2006). The manufacturer can be an entity other than
the original equipment manufacturer. Persons who make changes to motor
vehicles (that are otherwise certified as compliant with applicable FMVSSs)
before the first sale are considered alterers of the motor vehicle with
responsibilities to certify compliance with relevant FMVSSs. See 49 C.F.R. pt.
567, available at http://www.ecfr.gov/cgi-bin/text-idx?c=ecfr&sid=8c691a99067
d5d687f819dceaaefd8e5&rgn=div5&view=text&node=49:6.1.2.3.35&idno=49#49
:6.1.2.3.35.0.7.7. Further, in certain circumstances, modifications of used
vehicles are regarded as resulting in the manufacture of a new motor vehicle.
See 49 C.F.R. 571.7(e) and (f).
196. See id.
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because of defects present in the components of those
technologies or because of defects attributable to the improper
installation of the technology by an alterer. In order to
establish a defect, NHTSA must show a significant number of
performance failures.197 Under the Safety Act, the presence of
a defect is not dependent on the source of the performance
failure leading to an unreasonable risk to motor vehicle
safety.198 Thus, a defect can be based on the improper
assembly of a motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment.199 As
the components of autonomous driving technology are motor
vehicle equipment, NHTSA would be able to use the methods
discussed above to order a recall of autonomous driving
technology installed (as aftermarket equipment) on a vehicle
that was not originally manufactured as an autonomous
vehicle.200
Because of the potential benefits of autonomous driving
technology and the potential demand for the technology by
consumers, it is likely that some manufacturers of
autonomous driving technology will seek to convert vehicles
that were not originally manufactured as autonomous
vehicles to equip them with autonomous driving capabilities.
If the autonomous driving technologies are not properly
installed in the aftermarket by an alterer, it is possible that
the improper installation could be considered to have created
a defect if it posed an unreasonable risk to motor vehicle
safety. If NHTSA could establish a significant number of
performance failures caused by the improper installation of
aftermarket autonomous driving technology, the agency

197. United States v. Gen. Motors Corp. (Wheels), 518 F.2d 420, 432 (D.C.
Cir. 1975).
198. See § 30102(a)(2) (defining defect as including any “defect in
performance, construction, a component or material of a motor vehicle or motor
vehicle equipment”); see also Wheels, 518 F.2d at 432 (stating that the presence
of a defect can be established based exclusively on the performance of the
vehicle or equipment).
199. See United States v. Gen. Motors Corp. (Carburetors), 565 F.2d 754, 756
(D.C. Cir. 1977) (stating that the defect at issue in the case was caused by the
improper installation of a fuel inlet plug into a carburetor). The improper
installation of the fuel inlet plug into the carburetor during manufacturing was
not isolated to a small number of vehicles. Id. General Motors disclosed 665
fires in 1965 and 1966 Chevrolet and Buick models during the course of the
litigation. Id.
200. See § 30102(a)(2).
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would be able to order the recall of that technology. In such a
situation, NHTSA could argue that it was reasonably
foreseeable that the autonomous driving technology would be
improperly installed and that the technology was defective
because of the number of performance failures.201
NHTSA’s ability to order the recall of motor vehicle
equipment because of a defect in the installation of the
equipment is also important to the agency’s efforts to promote
vehicle-to-vehicle communications. Because the benefits of
any vehicle-to-vehicle communications system depend on the
penetration of the technology into the on road vehicle fleet,
aftermarket
installations
of
vehicle-to-vehicle
communications technology is crucial to increasing the
penetration of the technology and maximizing its full safety
benefits. NHTSA’s ability to order the recall of motor vehicle
equipment because of a defect in the installation of that
equipment will help ensure that aftermarket installations of
autonomous driving and vehicle-to-vehicle communications
technologies are implemented in a safe manner.
C. Establishing Unreasonable Risk
In addition to identifying a defect, NHTSA needs to show
that the defect poses an unreasonable risk to motor vehicle
safety in order to induce or (if necessary) require a
manufacturer to conduct a recall. The courts likely will look
at the threatened harm and the frequency of it. Courts will
not require a high frequency when the threat is substantial.202
In some cases, it will be easy to establish that a defect in an
advanced crash avoidance technology or autonomous driving
system poses an unreasonable risk to motor vehicle safety.
The hypothetical of the defect in a crash imminent braking
system that caused the vehicle to accelerate, instead of
braking, when a collision was imminent would increase
danger to the occupants of a vehicle equipped with the
defective system, as well as to the occupants of other vehicles,
and be considered an unreasonable risk to motor vehicle

201. Wheels, 518 F.2d at 438 (stating that NHTSA can establish a defect
based on performance failures caused by “reasonably-to-be-expected” abuse).
202. Carburetors, 565 F.2d at 758; United States v. Gen. Motors Corp.
(Pitman Arms), 561 F.2d 923, 928–29 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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safety.203 The high likelihood that this defect would not only
cause a frontal collision, but also increase its severity would
be considered a severe harm. A defect of this nature would
make the vehicle more dangerous than if the vehicle were not
equipped with the crash imminent braking system in the first
place.
Whether a given defect represents an unreasonable risk
to motor vehicle safety might not always be so clear as in the
hypothetical described above.
Determining whether a
defective advanced crash avoidance technology or
autonomous driving system poses a likelihood of harm might
depend on the functionality of the system as well as driver
reliance on that system. To the extent that a system only
provides warnings to the driver and does not cause the
vehicle to take any corrective action itself, driver reliance on
the system might be a significant issue.
If driver reliance on an autonomous driving system were
high, the failure of that system would have greater safety
consequences. In the case of a full or close to full automation
driving system, a failure of that system that would make it
necessary for the driver to take control of the vehicle would
likely pose an unreasonable risk to motor vehicle safety.204
Having become accustomed to relying upon the autonomous
driving system, drivers might not be able to reacquire
situational awareness (i.e., awareness of the potential for
crashes in the immediate driving environment) in a very
short period of time and take control of their vehicle quickly
enough when the system fails.205
It is possible that drivers might come to rely on the
autonomous driving system to such an extent that they will
not respond when presented with a situation in which the
autonomous driving system is no longer in control of the
203. See Pitman Arms, 561 F.2d at 928 (stating that a “commonsense”
approach should be used when determining if a defect poses an unreasonable
risk to motor vehicle safety).
204. See Joan Lowry, “Automation Addition” Damaging Pilots’ Flying Skills:
Report, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 30, 2011, 7:48 AM), available at
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/08/30/automation-addiction-dama_0_n_942
604.html (examining how increased reliance on automated flight systems has
impacted pilots’ ability to fly without the aid of the automated system).
205. See id. (discussing incidents in which the automated flight controls
failed and the pilot was unable to regain control of the aircraft).
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vehicle.206 Several factors would compound the risks created
by the failure of an autonomous driving system. One is a
sudden failure. Another is failure that occurs without the
driver being given any indication that it has occurred.
Drivers in the latter situation would likely not realize that
the autonomous driving system is no longer in control of the
vehicle until it is too late to avoid a collision.
Even if the root cause of a defect might be more difficult
to ascertain than in the era when vehicle systems were
primarily mechanical, NHTSA generally needs only to point
to a performance failure to establish a defect. As driver
reliance on advanced crash avoidance technologies and
autonomous driving systems increases, so will the risk of
harm from the failure of these systems. While NHTSA might
need additional data and tools to help determine whether
there is a failure of performance in connection with certain
types of defects in these systems, the agency will still be able
to point to performance failures of these systems as grounds
for ordering recalls of defective vehicles.
VI. COMPARATIVE SAFETY PERFORMANCE INFORMATION
PROGRAMS
A. Role of the New Car Assessment Program (NCAP) in
Encouraging Autonomous Motor Vehicle Features
Public awareness of differences in the relative safety
performance characteristics between different vehicle models
through NCAP has helped foster consumer demand for safety
and strongly encourages manufacturers to build motor
vehicles that exceed the minimum performance requirements
in the FMVSSs. NHTSA has recognized that “the success of
the NCAP requires change if manufacturers are to be
continually
challenged
to
make
voluntary
safety
improvements to their vehicles.”207 Thus, NHTSA will strive
to continually update NCAP as necessary to continue to
“incentiv[ize] and encourage accelerated deployment of these

206. See generally id.
207. NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., DOT HS 810 698, THE NEW
CAR ASSESSMENT PROGRAM SUGGESTED APPROACHES FOR FUTURE PROGRAM
ENHANCEMENTS 3 (2007).
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new, advanced technologies.”208
As advanced crash avoidance technologies are
increasingly electronic and continue to advance along the
continuum toward full automation, the foreseeable future
challenges confronting NCAP will be assessing and
publicizing the benefits of these advanced technologies that
are continuously and rapidly evolving. In addition, many of
these technologies possess a high level of variation in design
and
composition
of
safety
applications
between
manufacturers.
Thus, determining which of these
technologies offer the most promise in addressing the most
frequently occurring crash scenarios might be challenging.
While these new technologies might have great safety benefit,
there might be little information and real-world data to
provide a basis for evaluating the existence of a safety benefit
and to serve as the basis for NHTSA recommending the
technology to consumers through NCAP.
In developing ratings for NCAP, NHTSA is not bound by
the same statutory requirements that apply when the agency
issues FMVSSs.209 This gives the agency more flexibility in
devising NCAP rating criteria and methodologies. Through
NCAP, NHTSA could promote a technology that has evident
safety benefits but which the agency is not yet prepared to
require as a part of an FMVSS.
B. Current NCAP
NCAP provides vehicle crashworthiness information to
consumers through a rating system based on one to five stars
(five being the highest rating). Every year, NCAP rates the
crashworthiness of selected vehicle models210 and provides a
208. Consumer Information: New Car Assessment Program, 73 Fed. Reg.
40,016, 40,033 (July 11, 2008) (emphasis added).
209. The statute authorizing NCAP directs NHTSA to maintain a program
for providing information to consumers on the damage susceptibility and
crashworthiness of vehicles in order to assist consumers in purchasing vehicles.
See 49 U.S.C. § 32302 (2006).
210. For MY 2012, NCAP will “provide consumer safety information on
approximately 81 percent of model year 2012 passenger vehicles sold in the
United States, while rollover tests will provide information on 92 percent of the
2012 fleet.” NHTSA Announces Model Year 2012 Vehicles to be Rated Under
Government 5-Star Safety Ratings Program, NEWS (U.S. Dep’t of Transp.,
Washington,
D.C.),
Oct.
13,
2011,
at
1,
available
at
http://www.nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/communications/pdf/nhtsa1711.pdf.
This
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vehicle safety score (VSS) star rating. The VSS is derived
from a particular vehicle’s combined success on three testing
criteria: frontal crash, side crash, and rollover resistance. In
addition to the overall VSS, NCAP provides independent star
ratings for the subject vehicle’s success during each one of the
three crashworthiness tests.
NCAP also provides information to the public about
selected advanced crash avoidance technologies. NHTSA
selects crash avoidance technologies for inclusion in NCAP’s
crash avoidance ratings program based on technical maturity
of the technology, the availability of the technology in the
current fleet, and the availability of safety effectiveness data
for the technology. 211 NHTSA has selected three advanced
crash avoidance technologies to be recommended and
promoted through NCAP: Electronic Stability Control (ESC),
Forward Collision Warning (FCW), and Lane Departure
Warning (LDW).212 These three technologies are currently
the only advanced crash avoidance technologies that meet the
agency’s criteria for inclusion in NCAP.213
Because vehicles equipped with ESC have been available
for some time, NHTSA was able to rely on real-world data to
establish ESC’s effectiveness. In contrast, FCW and LDW are
relatively new technologies with limited available real-world
data.
In estimating the safety benefits of these two
technologies, NHTSA relied on data from large scale field
operational tests (FOTs). NHTSA believes “that the FOT
results for FCW and LDW are applicable for estimating realworld safety benefits since these technologies were evaluated
in the same real-world driving environment in which they
would be deployed.”214 NHTSA also used FOT data and other
means “NHTSA will rate 74 vehicles for the FY 2012 model year . . . .” Id.
211. See CONSUMER INFORMATION; NEW CAR ASSESSMENT PROGRAM, 73 Fed.
Reg. at 40,016–40,017, 40,033.
212. Id. at 40,017.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 40,033. In general, in an FOT, the major variables impacting a
technology’s safety benefits, including differences in individual driving styles
and behavior, system performance, and driver acceptance, are taken into
account. Likewise, critical safety incidents (i.e., near-crash incidents that occur
during the FOT) data are recorded and evaluated to determine if the technology
provided a safety benefit in terms of critical incident reduction. Assuming a
proportional relationship between near-crash events and actual crashes, critical
incident data are further evaluated using statistical methods to estimate crash
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agency research to develop test procedures and minimum
performance criteria in order to validate that technologies
purporting to be FCW or LDW in fact have the requisite
performance capabilities.215 Following its evaluation, NHTSA
concluded that (at that time) it did not yet have enough data
to recommend other technologies such as “collision mitigation
braking systems, lane-keeping assist systems, and side object
detection technologies.”216
Unlike for traditional crash test ratings, NHTSA does not
provide vehicle model specific comparative individual or
overall ratings for advanced crash avoidance technologies as
it does for a vehicle model’s crashworthiness.217 The current
NCAP does not rate the crash avoidance capabilities of
individual vehicles because NHTSA’s current test procedures
have not been designed to comparatively rate the
effectiveness of different manufacturers’ advanced crash
avoidance systems.218
Instead, the agency established
performance tests to verify that a particular vehicle model
has systems that possess the minimum qualities and
characteristics of these technologies.219 A vehicle model’s
NCAP crashworthiness ratings are supplemented by a symbol
or symbols indicating which of the three recommended
advanced crash avoidance technologies are installed on that
model.
C. Estimating the Safety Benefits of New Technology as
Early as the Pre-Production Stage
As advanced crash avoidance technologies are rapidly
developing, NHTSA is seeking new ways to estimate safety
benefits of these technologies. In addition to using the field
operational tests discussed above to identify safety benefits of
emerging technologies earlier, NHTSA has initiated the

reduction benefits. In the field tests for FCW and LDW systems, NHTSA
provided technical management and the Volpe National Transportation
Systems Center performed an independent evaluation to estimate safety
benefits which included rigorous statistical analysis. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 40,034.
218. Id.
219. Id.
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Advanced Crash Avoidance Technologies (ACAT I220) research
program, in conjunction with vehicle manufacturers, to
develop standardized methodologies to evaluate the
effectiveness of advanced technologies in mitigating specific
types of vehicle crashes; and to develop and demonstrate
objective tests that can verify the safety impact of a real
system.221
To accomplish this goal, the agency has focused on
developing methodologies for estimating safety benefits of
systems at the pre-production stage by extrapolating the
NHTSA has developed a
results of laboratory tests.222
common framework that can be tailored to evaluating the
safety benefits of each different crash avoidance technology.
This framework includes identifying crash scenarios that the
technology is designed to mitigate.223 The methodologies rely
on computer models, human factors research, and
performance tests.224 Four research groups have created
220. Art Carter, Presentation at the SAE Government/Industry Meeting: The
Advanced Crash Avoidance Technologies Program (Feb. 4, 2009), available at
http://www.sae.org/events/gim/presentations/2009/artcarter1.pdf.
221. NHTSA’s objective for the ACAT program is to develop a methodology
for estimating the potential effectiveness of advanced safety technologies
intended to assist drivers in avoiding crashes. U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP.: NAT’L
HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., DOT HS 811 088, ADVANCED CRASH
AVOIDANCE TECHNOLOGIES PROGRAM: ANNUAL REPORT 1 (2009) [hereinafter
REPORT],
available
at
http://www.nhtsa.gov/DOT/NHTSA/
ANNUAL
NRD/Multimedia/PDFs/Crash%20Avoidance/2009/811088.pdf; U.S. DEP’T OF
TRANSP.: NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., DOT HS 811 454H,
ADVANCED CRASH AVOIDANCE TECHNOLOGIES PROGRAM: FINAL REPORT OF THE
HONDA-DRI TEAM (2011) [hereinafter HONDA-DRI TEAM], available at
http://www.nhtsa.gov/DOT/NHTSA/NVS/Crash%20Avoidance/Technical%20Pub
lications/2011/811454H.pdf. NHTSA’s prior experience indicates that the
effectiveness of advanced safety technologies in reducing crashes is not well
understood. ANNUAL REPORT, supra, at 1; HONDA-DRI TEAM, supra. ACAT is
targeted at developing some of the tools needed for calculating the estimated
benefit of these technologies in relation to the crashes they are intended to
prevent. ANNUAL REPORT, supra, at 1; HONDA-DRI TEAM, supra.
222. See ARTHUR A. CARTER ET AL., SAFETY IMPACT METHODOLOGY (SIM):
EVALUATION OF PRE-PRODUCTION SYSTEMS 1 (2009), available at http://wwwnrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/pdf/esv/esv21/09-0259.pdf. In addition “to form[ing] the basis
for regulatory evaluations of potential new requirements[,]” new SIMs for preproduction systems can be used: “1) as part of the design process of new
systems, 2) to evaluate the performance of pre-production systems before
marketing, 3) to provide guidance to safety advocates, such as NHTSA, on new
safety improvements . . . .” Id.
223. Id. at 4.
224. See id.
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methodologies within NHTSA’s framework for evaluating
different crash avoidance technologies or “countermeasures”
including the Advanced Collision Mitigation Braking System
Countermeasure, Lane Departure Collision Countermeasures, Pre-collision Safety System Countermeasures, and
Backing-Collision Countermeasures.225
D. Future Role for NCAP in Promoting Advanced Crash
Avoidance Technologies
As more advanced crash avoidance technologies are
introduced into the new vehicle fleet and demonstrate safety
benefits, NHTSA will be able to decide whether to continue
its current approach of informing consumers of the presence
of advanced crash avoidance technologies on a vehicle model
or to begin comparatively rating vehicle models based on
their overall ability to avoid crashes. To some extent, the
agency’s approach will depend on how the driving public
views advanced crash avoidance technologies. Recent focus
groups conducted by the agency suggest that drivers have yet
to understand the potential of these technologies.226 Different
consumers might also place different values on advanced
crash avoidance technologies and autonomous driving
systems, based on personal preferences and driving habits.
In recommending advanced crash avoidance technologies, the
agency might need to take into account how different driving
habits and preferences might impact consumers’ choices
about purchasing vehicles equipped with these technologies.
If the agency chooses to continue to promote advanced
crash avoidance technologies by presenting information about
individual technologies in the same manner as is currently
used on the NCAP website, the agency will need to develop
benefit estimates and decide which technologies to list at a
pace that equals the rate of their penetration into the new
vehicle fleet.
As these technologies on vehicles will
increasingly operate in tandem, it might be challenging for
NHTSA to determine how to apportion the credit among the
linked technologies for the benefits they generate. If different
manufacturers use different combinations of technologies to

225. See id. at 5–8.
226. Id.
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address similar crash scenarios, the problem of providing
information
that
differentiates
between
available
technologies will increase. As the number of crash avoidance
technologies increases, however, the number of beneficial
technologies recommended by the agency might increase to
the point at which consumers could become confused by the
number of technologies recommended by the agency.227
Accordingly, the agency might need to shift its approach and
rate a vehicle’s overall ability to avoid crashes as it currently
does for a vehicle’s crashworthiness in order to provide
consumers with meaningful information and to encourage
continued innovation.
VII. NHTSA’S STANDARDS WILL LIKELY INFLUENCE OR BE
INFLUENCED BY LARGER PUBLIC POLICY CHOICES
NHTSA inevitably will play a role in influencing the
manner and pace with which autonomous driving systems are
developed and introduced. Even issues relating to driver
behavior, vehicle maintenance, and vehicle system tampering
are likely to be influenced by NHTSA’s research and
regulatory activities as autonomous driving systems become
more advanced and assume greater driving responsibilities.
Issues related to driver behavior and maintenance of
vehicles on public roads are generally the domain of state and
local governments. Several States, most recently California,
have adopted laws governing the testing and operation of
autonomous vehicles on public roads.228
227. See id. (explaining that consumers found it difficult to make sense of
potential NCAP rating involving multiple check marks, star ratings, or grading
scales even when a reference key is provided).
228. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 482A.30, 482A.100 (2012) (defining
autonomous technology and directing the Department of Motor Vehicles to
issuing regulations authorizing the operation and testing of autonomous
vehicles); FLA. STAT. § 316.85 (2012) (establishing requirements for autonomous
vehicles registered in the state and testing requirements).
On September 25, 2012, the Governor of California signed legislation
expressly authorizing the testing on public roads of autonomous vehicles as long
as their driver’s seat is occupied by a licensed driver. See 2012 Cal. Stat. 91.
This legislation requires the California Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) to
issue, not later than January 1, 2015, regulations establishing a process for
manufacturers of autonomous vehicles to submit applications to operate
autonomous vehicles on public roads for purposes other than testing. See id.
The legislation prohibits the operation of autonomous vehicles on public roads
for non-testing purposes until the DMV approves the application of a
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As the prevalence and sophistication of autonomous
driving technology increases, NHTSA might find it
appropriate to issue new FMVSSs to address the performance
of those technologies. For example, NHTSA could influence
the scenarios in which autonomous motor vehicles are
allowed to operate in autonomous mode through a vehicle
safety standard. It would be possible for NHTSA to issue
standards requiring that an autonomous motor vehicle only
function in autonomous mode at certain speeds or only on
roads sensed to be limited access highways.229
Further, autonomous driving systems might significantly
increase the importance of motor vehicle maintenance in
ensuring vehicle safety. It is possible that an autonomous
motor vehicle’s ability to avoid crashes will depend on
consistent software updates and hardware upkeep to ensure
that the vehicle’s autonomous driving system will have the
necessary information to make decisions about its
surroundings.
Further, failure to maintain a vehicle’s
autonomous driving systems can potentially have
consequences for other road users (especially in a connected
vehicle environment). In this situation, the utility of the
autonomous driving systems and the ability of the systems to
manufacturer of autonomous vehicles pursuant to those regulations. See id.
The legislation defines the term “autonomous vehicle manufacturer” as (1) a
person who manufactures vehicles originally equipped with autonomous
technology or (2) a person that modifies a vehicle by equipping the vehicle with
autonomous technology so as to convert it into an autonomous vehicle. See id.
The legislation requires autonomous vehicle manufacturers wishing to obtain
permission from the DMV for the operation of their autonomous vehicles on
public roads for non-testing purposes to submit an application to the DMV
certifying that their autonomous vehicles meet all applicable Federal motor
vehicle safety standards, have certain capabilities that enable the driver to
retake control of the vehicle when it is in autonomous mode, are able to notify
the driver when the vehicle is in autonomous mode, and can capture and store
from the autonomous technology sensor data for the period thirty seconds prior
to a crash. See id. Finally, the legislation requires the DMV to notify the
legislature if any manufacturer submits an application for permission to operate
an autonomous vehicle on public roads without the presence of a driver inside
the vehicle. See id.
229. NHTSA has issued several safety standards that, while not applicable to
used vehicles, affect the operation of a vehicle. The agency can issue standards
with explicit requirements for when required safety systems must be active and
when these systems may not be active. See FMVSS No. 108, Lamps, Reflective
Devices, and Associated Equipment, 49 C.F.R. § 571.108, para. S5.1.4 (2009)
(prescribing activation and deactivation requirements for school bus lamps).
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safely operate would depend on whether the vehicle owner
updates the vehicle’s software and maintains the vehicle’s
systems in a timely manner. It is possible that NHTSA could
work with states and issue standards to ensure that vehicle
owners updated the software that controls autonomous
driving systems by issuing used vehicle standards.230
In addition, adopting these technologies might also
increase the importance of preventing vehicle owners from
tampering with autonomous driving systems. As autonomous
driving systems control an increasing number of vehicle
functions it is possible that some drivers might want to alter
the decision-making process of the autonomous motor
vehicle’s computer or otherwise alter the way in which the
autonomous motor vehicle behaves.231 The likelihood of such
behavior might increase if, for example, federal or state
governments chose to require autonomous driving systems be
activated under certain conditions. The agency is able to
prevent manufacturers, distributors, dealers, or motor vehicle
repair businesses from disabling required safety devices
installed on vehicles.232 However, this authority does not
prevent owners from making changes that would disable a
safety system in their own vehicles.233 While the agency
might discourage system tampering by establishing a
standard that requires autonomous driving systems to have a
certain level of tamper-resistance, additional statutory
authority or coordinated action with state and local
governments would be required in order to legally prevent
owners from tampering with these systems.
NHTSA will have a variety of choices about the role it
plays in influencing the manner and pace with which
autonomous motor vehicles are adopted. NHTSA could
choose to promote autonomous driving technologies by
including these technologies in NCAP, by requiring that
230. See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 30126 (2006).
231. See Sarah Aue & Frank Douma, ITS and Locational Privacy:
Suggestions for Peaceful Coexistence, 78 J. TRANSP. L. LOGISTICS & POL’Y 89,
111 (2011) (describing efforts of vehicle owners to remove ignition interlock
devices that prevented the vehicle from starting if the driver did not have the
belt fastened that manufacturers installed on vehicles to meet the passive
restraint requirements in FMVSS No. 208).
232. 49 U.S.C. § 30122 (2006).
233. Id.
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voluntarily installed autonomous driving technologies meet
specific performance requirements, by requiring that certain
autonomous driving technologies be installed in motor
vehicles as mandatory equipment or by defining the types of
driving environments or conditions in which vehicles will be
permitted to function in autonomous mode. These decisions
will be based on factors such as the maturity of technologies,
the safety benefits to be gained from the use of these
technologies, the cost of obtaining those benefits, and the
extent to which these technologies function without
unintended safety consequences.
CONCLUSION
The advanced crash avoidance technologies and
autonomous driving systems being incorporated into motor
vehicles today represent an exciting trend. There is a great
potential for autonomous driving technologies to yield
significant safety benefits. Autonomous driving technologies
offer the promise of mitigating the greatest risk factor on the
highway today—unsafe actions by human drivers. While
many of these technologies were not envisioned at the time
Congress passed the Safety Act, one can see through the
analysis in this Article that many of the currently available
regulatory tools can be effectively applied to these new
technologies. Although NHTSA would likely need to act in
conjunction with other entities in order to address some
aspects of the concerns with privacy, security, and external
vehicle connections and vehicle maintenance of advanced
crash avoidance technologies and autonomous driving
systems in used vehicles, NHTSA’s authority is broad enough
to address a wide variety of issues affecting the safety of
vehicles equipped with these technologies and systems.
Whether, when and how NHTSA exercises its authority to
regulate autonomous vehicles depends on the results of ongoing research, on the gathering and analyzing of information
relating to the developing, testing and eventual introducing of
those vehicles and on policy choices that have yet to be made
by the agency and the Department of Transportation.
However, as autonomous vehicle technologies develop, it is
likely that NHTSA will continue to conduct research,
eventually develop appropriate performance requirements
and test procedures, and actively utilize alternatives to direct
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regulation such as comparative performance information in
partnership with stakeholders, including manufacturers,
consumer groups and the states.

